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INTRODUCTION
HE mention of agriculture conjures up in the public mind
visions of a farming family struggling to make a living off the
land. Similarly, "agricultural cooperative" evokes images of sev-
eral individual farmers banding together to take their produce to
market. Few people perceive agriculture and cooperatives as
large, profitable business enterprises. Yet, Land O'L~kes is a co-
operative whose $3.8 billion in sales for 1982 ranked it at number
100 on the "Fortune 500."'
Many agricultural cooperatives have developed enormous
economic power. When Associated Milk Producers, Inc.
(A.M.P.I.) signed its antitrust consent decree in 1975 it had al-
most 40,000 members, and its sales qualified it as number 141 on
the "Fortune 500."2 A.M.P.I. conducted business in twenty-two
of the sixty-two Federal Milk Marketing Orders,3 ranging from
the Chicago area through Memphis and Wichita to San Antonio; 4
the cooperative had market shares in excess of ninety percent in
half of these areas.
1. "Fortune 500" is an annual directory ranking by volume of sales the larg-
est United States industrial corporations. See FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 316.
As a prerequisite for inclusion in the Fortune 500, all companies must have de-
rived more than 50% of their sales from manufacturing and/or mining. Sales
include rental and other revenues but exclude dividends, interest, and other
non-operating revenues. Id.
Other large dairy cooperatives are Associated Milk Producers, Inc., at 151
(S15) for 1982; Mid-America Dairymen, at 255 for 1984; Dairymen, Inc., at 266
(S50) for 1982; Wisconsin Dairies Cooperative, at 485 for 1982; Michigan Milk
Producers Association, at 438 for 1984. The cooperative rankings followed by
an (S-) ranking were ranked at that level in the Fortune Service 500; the 500
ranking is where they would have ranked in the industrial 500. Id. at 266-85; id.,
May 2, 1983, at 226-54; id.,June 13, 1983, at 152-73.
2. United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 32-33
n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976); FORTUNE, May 1975, at 214 (ranking for 1974).
3. For a discussion of the Federal Milk Marketing Orders, see infra notes
81-88 and accompanying text.
4. See P.M. Eisenstat, R.T. Masson, & D. Roddy, An Economic Analysis of
the Associated Milk Producers, Inc. Monopoly 84-85, filed with the court in
United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mo.
1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
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The current size of cooperatives and the economic power
they now wield are in sharp contrast to the early 1900's when
farmers marketed their produce individually and, as a result, had
little bargaining power with their large corporate customers.
Congressional passage of the agricultural antitrust exemption5
encouraged the formation of agricultural cooperatives 6 intended
to countervail the monopsony7 power then held by the corporate
purchasers. Over time, with the help of regulation and permis-
sive application of antitrust principles to cooperative activities,
the balance of power has shifted. In some markets, cooperatives
enjoy a monopoly position-they supervail buyer power.8 The
consequence of this shift is that inordinately high prices must be
paid for produce and those inflated costs are passed on to
consumers.
The current administration appears determined to reduce
price supports, and hence prices. It is reasonable to expect the
cooperatives to respond by trying to maintain prices. This re-
quires a strong cooperative and cooperation between coopera-
tives. If the past is any guage of the future, the cooperation of
some smaller cooperatives and independent farmers may only be
gained through threats and coercion. The path to high prices for
the larger cooperatives may be again littered with casualties. Vig-
orous antitrust enforcement may be essential to maintain healthy
competition in agricultural markets.
This article asserts that, when the agricultural antitrust ex-
emption is confined to its intended borders, cooperative monopo-
lization, anticompetitive activities, and unreasonably high
5. The principal statutes granting this exemption are the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1982), and the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1982).
These acts will be referred to collectively as "the antitrust exemption," "the ag-
ricultural exemption," "limited immunity," etc. The primary antitrust laws of
relevance to this paper are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) and the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
6. An agricultural cooperative is an association of farmers that jointly con-
ducts processing, preparing for market, handling, or marketing of products. S.
OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON &J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, CASES, TEXT
AND COMMENTARY 32 (4th ed. 1981).
7. For a definition and discussion of "monopsony power," see infra text
accompanying footnote 46. See also R.C. LIPSEY & P.O. STEINER, ECONOMICS 345
(5th ed. 1978).
8. "Countervail" is defined as "[t]o counterbalance; to avail against with
equal force or virtue; to compensate for, or serve as an equivalent of or substitute
for." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 316 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). When the
power relationship moves beyond balance to one in which the previously weaker
party is now dominant, that party can be said to have "supervailing" power. See
NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY 1898 (H. Emery & K. Brewster eds. 1963) (prefix
"super" is defined as "over, beyond, exceedingly, to excess").
1986]
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consumer food prices can each be addressed under the antitrust
laws. 9 Previous writings by both lawyers and economists have an-
alyzed the status of cooperatives under the antitrust laws, but no
single paper has analyzed the subject simultaneously from an eco-
nomic and legal standpoint. Moreover, much of the legal argu-
ment to date has rested on inadequate economic foundations.
Similarly, the economic analyses have relied on unrealistic as-
sumptions or have been hampered by flawed reasoning on topics
like the ability of cooperatives to control supply and the necessity
of their doing so. The resulting legal analysis has twisted and
misconstrued the plain language of the statute as well as the in-
tent of the congressional framers of the agricultural exemption.
This article uses the dairy industry to illustrate the extent of
the monopoly problem that now exists in some agricultural mar-
kets. It presents an economic model for determining the extent
of cooperative market power and detecting undue price enhance-
ment in a manner consistent with legislative intent.10 On these
economic foundations is built a legal analysis which demonstrates
how the antitrust laws may be used to combat cooperative mo-
nopolization, anticompetitive mergers, and undue price
enhancement. " I
I. ORIGINS OF THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION
A. Prevailing Conditions in the Early 1900's
Prior to the late nineteenth century, farmers traditionally
sold their produce directly to consumers. However, the develop-
ment of urban centers disrupted this practice and middlemen
emerged to take over the intermediate steps between harvest and
market-transportation, sorting, processing, and retail sales to
consumers. As the physical and economic distance between
farmer and consumer widened, a growing lack of complete supply
and demand information made it increasingly difficult for individ-
9. It has been argued by some commentators that, while a monopoly prob-
lem may exist, the current statutory framework does not permit a judicial rem-
edy. See, Note, Trustbusting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust
ExemptionsforAgricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 368 (1975) (analysis of
possible limits on antitrust exemptions with conclusion that under the most con-
servative interpretation of antitrust laws, such laws do not reach anticompetitive
behavior in agricultural sector). See also 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST LJ. 1, 7-13 (1967)
(general view of exemptions).
10. For a discussion of the pertinent legislative intent behind the Clayton
and Capper-Volstead Acts, see infra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of undue price enhancement, see infra notes 59-66 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 31: p. 183
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ual farmers to make accurate market predictions before locking
themselves into production decisions for the next harvest. 12 The
generally high perishability of agricultural products, the techno-
logical inability to store them for very long, and the absence of
efficient transportation left many individual farmers dependent
on one or a few handlers (processors or distributors). On many
occasions the middlemen abused this power.' 3 In an effort to
force down prices, the middlemen could simply threaten not to
buy; the prospect of rotten vegetables or spoiled milk was often
enough to make the farmer capitulate. In the dairy industry,
where individual farmers were dependent on handlers for weigh-
ing milk to specify its volume and for testing its butterfat content,
short-changing was a common practice.
From the farmers' perspective the market was atomistic and
localized. 14 There were numerous individual producers who
were isolated, unorganized, and had small market shares at their
doorsteps. In contrast, the buyers were often corporate entities,
few in number and able to choose from alternative sources of sup-
ply. The handlers usually assumed responsibility for transporting
the product from farm to market, leaving them literally "in the
driver's seat." Even when the farmers were able to execute con-
tracts with the handlers, breaches were difficult to detect and
costly to remedy. 15 In order to countervail the power wielded by
12. See Note, supra note 9, at 352-54. See also R. FONES, J. HALL & R.T.
MASSON, MILK MARKETING: A REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO
THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES 30-44 (1977) (discussing history of
problems facing farmers in early 1900's); E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, SOME
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING MILK PRICES 20-27 (U.S. Dep't of Agricul-
ture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration 1937) (tracing development of
milk marketing cooperatives as response to producers' difficulties in assembly
and distribution of milk).
13. See A. KORPELA, FEDERAL FARM LAW MANUAL 263-64 (1956) (deception
was common in farm products markets).
14. E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12, at 20-23 (discussing segregation
of milk-production and milk-distribution units); A. KORPELA, supra note 13, at 3.
Korpela states that individual farmers were very dependent on far-off city mar-
kets. Id.
15. For a further discussion of unscrupulous tactics used by dairy handlers
and other agricultural "middlemen," see E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12,
at 20-23 (farmers need equal bargaining position); Harris, Classified Pricing of
Milk: Some Theoretical Aspects, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE MKT.
SERV. TECH. BULL. No. 1184 20-23 (1958) (increased scale of middlemen gave
them monopsony power, forcing farmers to desperately accept extremely low
prices); Knapp, Capper-Volstead Impact on Cooperative Structure, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRI-
CULTURE, FARMER COOPERATIVE SERV., INFORMATION No. 97 at 3 (1975) (farmers
need market power to protect themselves from big business).
For a discussion of the inadequacy of legal remedies for contractual dis-
putes, see Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability, 12 J.
1986]
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the middlemen, farmers sought to organize. Joint efforts in mar-
keting and transportation were thought to achieve two producer
goals: (1) a more economical and efficient system of production
and distribution, and (2) more equitable distribution and control
of the benefits of the production and distribution system.16
The growth of the cooperative movement was fraught with
uncertainty as to its status under the antitrust laws. The very get-
ting together of farmers to agree on price and to jointly market
their products could be considered an agreement in restraint of
trade, 17 and some cooperatives were found guilty of antitrust vio-
lations by the courts.' 8 Though most states eventually passed
statutes authorizing the existence of agricultural cooperatives and
exempting them from antitrust liability,' 9 many observers ques-
tioned the constitutional validity of these laws. 20
LEGAL STUD. 333 (1983). For a general discussion of contractual reliability, see
Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competi-
tive Contractng Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297 (1978).
16. See E.G. NOURSE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATION 11-
24 (1928) (analysis of producers' goals sought to be achieved through
cooperatives).
17. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 219-20 (1977) (restraints of trade are con-
tracts or combinations that tend or are designed to eliminate or stifle
competition).
18. See e.g., Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155 Ill. 166, 39 N.E. 651
(1895) (purpose of arrangement between corporation and stockholders was to
fix prices and control amount of milk shipped); Reeves v. Decorah Farmer's Co-
operative Soc'y, 160 Iowa 194, 140 N.W. 844 (1913) (so long as competition is
regarded as life of trade, all combinations, contracts, arrangements, or agree-
ments made to stifle it are regarded as unlawful).
19. See Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362
U.S. 458, 464 (1960) (noting passage by state legislatures of legislation authoriz-
ing existence of agricultural cooperatives); E. G. NOURSE, supra note 16, at 51-
72;Jensen, The Bill of Rights of U.S. Cooperative Agriculture, 20 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
181, 191 n.29 (1948) (collecting state statutes declaring that agricultural cooper-
atives are not in restraint of trade).
20. See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 556-65 (1902)
(holding Illinois statute granting antitrust exemption to "agriculturalists [and]
live stock raisers" to be repugnant to fourteenth amendment equal protection);
In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 645-50 (N.D. Tex. 1897) (state statute granting exemption
from state antitrust legislation to "agricultural products in hands of original pro-
ducer and raiser" held violative of fourteenth amendment equal protection),
rev'd on other grounds, Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898). See also Georgia Fruit
Exchange v. Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App. 123, 142-43, 62 So. 542, 549 (1913) (pub-
lic policy violated by agricultural contract restrainting trade); Ford v. Chicago
Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155 Ill. 166, 178, 39 N.E. 657, 651 (1895) (conspiracy to
regulate milk prices not exempt); Reeves v. Decorah Farmer's Cooperative
Soc'y, 160 Iowa 194, 205, 140 N.W. 844, 848 (1913) (exceptions to antitrust
laws not applicable).
[Vol. 31: p. 183
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B. Section 6 of the Clayton Act
In order to put to rest the uncertainty surrounding coopera-
tives and the antitrust laws, Congress, via section 6 of the Clayton
Act, 2 ' exempted from the reach of the Act "the existence and op-
eration of . . . agricultural . . . organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help . . . lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof."22 The House and Senate Reports evince a lim-
ited purpose-simply to allow farmers to form cooperatives with-
out the very existence of the organizations subjecting them to
antitrust prosecution, as was the case previously. 3 The "legiti-
mate objects" of cooperatives included countervailing the power
of the purchasers: "individual farmers should be given, through
agricultural cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified com-
petitive advantage--and responsibility-available to businessmen
acting through corporations as entities." 24 However, Congress
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
22. Id. § 17. The full text of § 6 reads:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual mem-
bers of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate ob-
jects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1914). The report
provides:
In the light of previous decisions of the courts and in view of a
possible interpretation of the law which would empower the courts to
order the dissolution of such organizations and associations, your com-
mittee feels that all doubt should be removed as to the legality of the
existence and operations of these organizations and associations, and
that the law should not be construed in such a way as to authorize their
dissolution by the courts under the antitrust laws or to forbid the indi-
vidual members of such associations from carrying out the legitimate
and lawful objects of their associations.
Id. See also S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1914).
24. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
466 (1960) (emphasis added). The literature of the early 1900's dealing with the
growth of the cooperative movement is replete with references to the need to
bargain collectively and share market information in order to countervail the
power of the middlemen. It was thought that by developing efficient marketing
and distribution systems, the return to the farmer could be raised at the same
time that the price to the consumer could be lowered. E.G. NOURSE, supra note
16, at 15-16; E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12, at 20-26. Gaumnitz and
Reed stated that:
[t]he major points stressed seem to be that consumers should be
charged reasonable prices and that farmers should receive fair prices,
depending on market conditions. Much emphasis was placed on the
1986]
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did not intend to authorize cooperatives to engage in anticompe-
titive activities forbidden to corporations. 25
C. The Capper- Volstead Act
Cooperatives flourished in the years following the enactment
of section 6 of the Clayton Act but two serious problems re-
mained. First, exempt cooperatives could not issue capital stock,
which was thought to be necessary to effectively countervail the
power of corporate middlemen.2 6 Second, the question remained
inequality of the bargaining power of producers in negotiations with
distributors, and on the belief that cooperatives could render certain
services more efficiently, could by joint action promote the use of their
product, and the like.
Id. at 25.
25. In construing the applicability of § 6 of the Clayton Act to a labor or-
ganization's secondary boycott, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or its
members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal
and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade. Any by no fair or permissible construction can it be
taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally law-
ful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade as defined by the anti-trust laws.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921) (emphasis ad-
ded). Accord Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 805 (1945)
(Court declined to interpret Clayton Act as manifesting congressional purpose
to exempt labor unions from Sherman Act).
The Supreme Court expressly approved the application of this reasoning to
agricultural organizations. See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1960). See also United States v. King, 250 F. 908
(D. Mass. 1916). The district court in King stated that blacklisting and secondary
boycotts cannot "be held to be a lawful carrying out of the legitimate objects of
such an association .... [T]hey are not privileged to adopt methods of carrying
on their business which are not permitted to other lawful associations." Id. at
910.
26. The legislative debates relating to the Capper-Volstead Act exhibit this
concern. For example, Representative Hersman stated that "the farmer of to-
day finds that his associations must have capital stock in order to handle his
business most effectively." 59 CONG. REC. 8025 (1920). A House report
provided:
Whenever a farmer seeks to sell his products he meets in the market
place the representatives of vast aggregations of organized capital that
largely determine the price of his products .... Many of the corpora-
tions with which he is compelled to deal are each composed of from
thirty to forty thousand members. These members collectively do busi-
ness as one person. The officers of the corporation act as agents of
these members.
H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921). As one supporter stated:
Businessmen can combine by putting their money into corporations,
but it is impractical for farmers to combine their farms into similar cor-
porate form. The object of this bill is to modify the laws under which
business organizations are now formed, so that farmers may take ad-
vantage of the form of organization that is used by business concerns.
8
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as to what constituted the "lawful carrying out" of the "legitimate
objects" of cooperatives. 27 Congress passed the Capper-Volstead
Act to resolve these issues. 28
61 CONG. REc. 1033 (1920) (Remarks of Rep. Volstead). In addition, while the
legality of nonprofit associations was assumed, the status of for-profit coopera-
tives remained unclear. Knapp, supra note 15, at 3.
27. Some commentators have characterized the problem as stemming from
the fact that § 6 of the Clayton Act was intended chiefly as an exemption for
labor. They claim the exemption for agriculture was added as an afterthought,
without consideration of the differences between cooperatives and unions. See,
e.g. Lemmon, The Capper-Volstead Act-Will It Ever Grow Up?, 22 AD. L. REV. 443,
444 (1970) (little recognition given to differences between unions and coopera-
tives); Note, supra note 9, at 354 (broader implications of agricultural exemption
largely left unnoticed by Congress in its enactment of § 6 as primarily a labor
law). Yet, E.G. Nourse, writing in 1928, shortly after the Capper-Volstead Act
was passed, stated that there was considerable public and congressional aware-
ness of the for-profit nature of most existing cooperatives. E.G. NOURSE, supra
note 16, at 248. The Clayton Act exemption was purposely limited to "truely
co-operative organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help, without
capital stock, and ... not conducted for profit." Id. While it was, perhaps, not
as extensive an exemption as the farmers wanted, Nourse considered it "a tangi-
ble victory to have secured an affirmative statement." Id. In any event, clarifica-
tion of the protected activities was recognized as desirable:
While it seems evident that Congress intends that the farmer shall not
be prosecuted for acting collectively in the marketing of his product,
yet the Federal Law is such that these prosecutions may be threatened
or actually brought against him. The farmer does not relish the possi-
bility of being prosecuted for an alleged violation of law, even though
he feels fairly certain that he would not be convicted.
62 CONG. REC. 2059 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper). "[I]t is rather uncertain
what these farm organizations can lawfully do or what are 'the legitimate objects
thereof.'" 59 CONG. REC. 8023 (1920) (statement of Rep. Swope).
28. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1982). Section 1 of the Act, entitled "Authori-
zation of [Agricultural Products Producers] Associations; powers generally,"
provides:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers,
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in
collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing
in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so en-
gaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies in common;
and such associations and their members may make the necessary con-
tracts and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however,
That such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the mem-
bers thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the
following requirements:
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one
vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own
therein, or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or
membership capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmem-
bers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for
members.
7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
19861
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Capper-Volstead expanded the section 6 exemption to coop-
eratives with capital stock, identified the legitimate objects of such
cooperatives as collectively processing, handling, and marketing
products for the mutual benefit of members,2 9 and provided for
administrative regulation of cooperative activity.30
29. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
466 (1959) (quoting Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982)). See also Case-
Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 391 (1967) (Capper-Vol-
stead Act was intended to clarify exemption for agricultural organizations and to
extend it to cooperatives having capital stock); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler
& Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 28 (1962) (Capper-Volstead Act sets out
this immunity in greater specificity: persons engaged in production of agricul-
tural products may act together with or without capital stock); Hufstedler, A Pre-
diction: The Exemption Favoring Agricultural Cooperatives Will Be Reaffirmed, 22 AD.
LAw REV. 455, 458-59 (1970) (no question that Act was intended to extend ex-
emptions of Clayton Act, § 6, to cooperative corporations with capital stock).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982). Section 292 provides:
If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that any such
association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign com-
merce to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is
unduly enhanced by reason thereof, he shall serve upon such associa-
tion a complaint stating his charge in that respect, to which complaint
shall be attached, or contained therein, a notice of hearing, specifying a
day and place not less than thirty days after the service thereof, requir-
ing the association to show cause why an order should not be made
directing it to cease and desist from monopolization or restraint of
trade. An association so complained of may at the time and place so
fixed show cause why such order should not be entered. The evidence
given on such a hearing shall be taken under such rules and regulations
as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, reduced to writing, and
made a part of the record therein. If upon such hearing the Secretary
of Agriculture shall be of the opinion that such association monopolizes
or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent
that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced thereby,
he shall issue and cause to be served upon the association an order
reciting the facts found by him, directing such association to cease and
desist from monopolization or restraint of trade. On the request of
such association or if such association fails or neglects for thirty days to
obey such order, the Secretary of Agriculture shall file in the district
court in the judicial district in which such association has its principal
place of business a certified copy of the order and of all the records in
the proceeding, together with a petition asking that the order be en-
forced, and shall give notice to the Attorney General and to said associ-
ation of such filing. Such district court shall thereupon have
jurisdiction to enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside said
order, or enter such other decree as the court may deem equitable, and
may make rules as to pleadings and proceedings to be had in consider-
ing such order. The place of trial may, for cause or by consent of par-
ties, be changed as in other causes.
The facts found by the Secretary of Agriculture and recited or set forth
in said order shall be prima facie evidence of such facts, but either party
may adduce additional evidence. The Department of Justice shall have
charge of the enforcement of such order. After the order is so filed in
such district court and while pending for review therein the court may
issue a temporary writ of injunction forbidding such association from
10
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Section 1 of the Act allows cooperatives and their members
to act collectively in ways that could otherwise be prosecuted as
restraints of trade. For example, members may use the coopera-
tive to jointly set prices and market their products.
Section 2 of the Act supplements the existing forces (i.e.,
competition in the market place 3' and existing antitrust law32) ex-
pected to prevent countervailing power from becoming supervail-
ing power. The Secretary of Agriculture is charged with
responsibility for taking action against any "undue enhancement"
of agricultural prices that results from concerted farmer activi-
ties. 33 While administrative action was not meant to be the exclu-
violating such order or any part thereof. The court may, upon conclu-
sion of its hearing, enforce its decree by a permanent injunction or
other appropriate remedy. Service of such complaint and of all notices
may be made upon such association by service upon any officer or
agent thereof engaged in carrying on its business, or on any attorney
authorized to appear in such proceeding for such association, and such
service shall be binding upon such association, the officers, and mem-
bers thereof.
Id.
31. Many legislators doubted that agricultural cooperatives would be able
to manipulate the supply or price of their products: "But a farmers' monopoly is
impossible. If the cooperative marketing association makes its price too high,
the result is inevitable self-destruction by overproduction in the following years.
No other industry except agriculture has this automatic safeguard." 62 CONG.
REC. 2059 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Capper). Independents, new entrants, world
markets, and substitute products were expected to provide additional competi-
tion against the cooperative. E.G. NoURSE, supra note 16, at 429; Note, supra
note 9, at 357 (discussing limits on abuse of power).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921). The House report
provides:
In the event that associations authorized by this bill shall do any-
thing forbidden by the Sherman Antitrust Act, they will be subject to
the penalities imposed by that law. It is not sought to place these as-
sociations above the law but to grant them the same immunity from
prosecution that corporations now enjoy so that they may be able to do
business successfully in competition with them.
Id. See also 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1921) (statement of Rep. Volstead) ("It is ob-
jected in some quarters that this repeals the Sherman Act as to farmers. That is
not true any more than it is true that a combination of two or three corporations
violates the act. Such combinations may or may not monopolize or restrain
trade.").
33. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982). For the text of § 292, see supra note 30. As the
legislative history points out, this section gives
[tihe Secretary of Agriculture [the] power to prevent these organiza-
tions from exploiting the public. . . . But in the event that any such
association should monopolize or restrain trade so as to unduly en-
hance the price of any agricultural product ample provision is made in
the bill to protect the public .... In the event an association fails to
abide by his judgment it can not only be hailed into court but a tempo-
rary injunction can at once be issued against it.
H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1921).
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sive means of regulating cooperative activity,3 4 it was considered
an integral part of the overall scheme. Section 2 limits the powers
granted by section 1 and makes it clear that unduly enhancing
agricultural prices is not among the "legitimate objects" of coop-
eratives.3 5 In essence, the Capper-Volstead Act removes such ac-
tivities as price fixing from the per se3 6 category of antitrust
violations and subjects them to scrutiny under a "rule of rea-
son":3 7 Do the activities unduly enhance prices?38 The contem-
poraneous literature envisioned the following scheme: (1) that
the position of the cooperative would be firmly established as a
legitimate business enterprise; (2) that the Department of Agri-
culture would decide whether prices had become unduly en-
hanced; and (3) that cooperatives would stand on equal footing
with corporations in regard to permissible practices under the an-
titrust laws, meaning that the Federal Trade Commission would
retain the power to act where unfair trade practices were present
34. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
462-63 (1959) (court rejected contention that § 2 of Capper-Volstead was in-
tended to give Secretary of Agriculture primary jurisdiction, and thereby ex-
clude any prosecutions at all under Sherman Act); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 206 (1939) (no ground for saying that limited procedure is substi-
tute for provisions of Sherman Act, or permits the sort of combination and con-
spiracies charged unless Secretary of Agriculture takes action); Sunkist Growers,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 464 F. Supp. 302, 309-10 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (court
rejected propositon that Secretary of Agriculture's power to issue cease and de-
sist orders was by itself sufficient means of regulation).
35. The legislative history explains this:
Briefly, [§ 2] gives the Secretary of Agriculture power to prevent these
associations from exploiting the public .... This bill directs the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to supervise these associations . . . determining
whether the prices charged by any of these associations are excessive.
That is one of the duties that somebody must perform to safeguard the
public.
H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1921).
36. See S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON &J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 19. Per
se violations are agreements that are deemed inherently anticompetitive. Where
such an agreement exists, there is no need for a court to determine if it unrea-
sonably restrains trade. Id.
37. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (rule of reason
prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade and this must be judged by examining
alleged restraints and their actual effect on competition). For a discussion of the
relationship between the rule of reason and the per se doctrine, see L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 72 (1977).
38. Congress was well aware of the rule of reason and its application to
restraint of trade and monopolization at the time it passed the Capper-Volstead
Act. In presenting the bill to the Senate, Senator Sterling said that it "is exactly
in conformity with the principles laid down in the opinion of ChiefJustice White
[in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)]. The bill conforms to
the rule of reason, both in regard to contracts in restraint of trade and in regard
to attempts to create a monopoly." 62 CONG. REC. 2219 (1922) (remarks of Sen.
Sterling).
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and the Department of Justice could intervene when a coopera-
tive had "so monopolized the market machinery as to deprive
non-members of an outlet for their products" or otherwise acted
in restraint of trade.3 9 "In short, Congress in 1922 intended to
allow farmers to organize with limited powers for the purpose of
counteracting a specific problem: it did not intend to create orga-
nizations to replace one system of adverse market conditions with
another." 40 Congress intended its legislation to advance and sat-
isfy two needs-an increase in farmer income and protection of
consumers from unjustifiably high prices. 41
D. The Economic Roots of the Exemption
How could Congress expect the countervailing power of co-
operatives to raise farmers' incomes without having the effect of
raising consumers' prices? At what point is a price unduly en-
hanced? The answer to the first question can be found by explor-
ing the economic concepts of monopoly and monopsony power
and their interplay. The answer to the second question has been
the subject of debate among agriculture policy experts, lawyers
and economists. It will be shown here that, with proper economic
and legal analysis, "undue price enhancement" is capable of rea-
sonably precise definition.
1. Market Power
In a purely competitive market, neither buyers nor sellers
control the terms of trade. Individual buyers and individual sell-
ers are all price takers; the competitive price will be determined
39. E.G. NOURSE, supra note 16 at 260-61 (discussing congressional debate
on bill).
40. R. FONES,J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 75 (discussing Cap-
per-Volstead purposes).
41. See 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper). The Act
protects consumers in case farmer marketing associations attempt to unduly en-
hance prices. Id. The Act also addresses the problem of farmers who are receiv-
ing low prices for their products. Id. at 2059.
1986]
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by the intersection of the demand curve and the supply curve.42
In economics, "market power" is the generic term for the ability
of a buyer or seller to affect the terms of trade.43 When the sellers
have market power, however minimal, it is referred to in econom-
ics as "monopoly power." 44 Sellers can profit from the exercise
of monopoly power by acting together to restrict the quantity of-
fered for sale, thus raising the price to buyers. The gains from
doing this exceed the value of lost sales from diminished
output. 4
5
42. The supply curve, which is upward sloping, represents the amount that
competitive sellers, in the aggre-
gate, would be willing to sell at a GRAPH 1
given price. It also shows the mar-
ginal cost to sellers of producing Price
one additional unit at a given level
of output: "marginal cost," or =MC
"MC."
The demand curve, which is P
downward sloping, represents the Pc
amount that competitive buyers, in
the aggregate, would be willing to I D=MRP
purchase at a given price. It also I
shows the "marginal value" to buy-
ers of having one additional unit at Quantity
any given level of purchases. When 0C
a buyer is a business entity, the
value of an input is how much it contributes to the firm's profits from selling the
product into which the input is incorporated: "marginal revenue product," or
"MRP." In a competitive input market, buyers and sellers would trade Qc units
at Pc price.
43. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 67-83 (1981). Mar-
ket power does not exist in the perfectly competitive market because consumers
and sellers alike are only price-takers in such a market. Id. at 53.
44. See E.M. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND
ECONOMIC MODELS 63-72 (1968). Monopoly power is the power to fix prices,
exclude competitors, or control the market within a geographic area. Id. at 63.
See also infra note 47.
45. By offering less on the market, moving from Qc to Qm, a monopolist
can, based on the buyer's demand GRAPH 2
curve, sell Qm at Pm. The margi-
nal cost of production declines
from Pc to c. The gains from this Price
exercise of monopoly power are
represented by the area C (higher S=MC
profits on Qm units above the com- PM
petitive price) minus A (the profits c
not earned on units between Qm PC
and Qc which are no longer being
sold). The area B shows the reduc- c D
tion in costs from decreased pro- B
duction. Since the area of C is
larger than A, the monopolist
profits. Q Q O, Quantity
196
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"Monopsony power" is defined in economics as market
power in the hands of the buyer. Buyers profit from the exercise
of monopsony power by agreeing to reduce the amount of goods
or services purchased and offering sellers the lowest price they
will accept for the level of output. While the buyers lose some
value by reducing their purchases, the amount of that loss is less
than the amount gained by the lowered purchase price. 46 Not all
exercises of market power are so great as to be of antitrust con-
cern, and virtually all commercial transactions involve the pres-
ence of some economic power.47 Some applied economists and
most lawyers and judges reserve the use of such terms as "market
power" and "monopoly power" for situations where the power
exceeds the level they consider to be "significant." However, in
strict economic terms, "market power" encompasses even mini-
mal amounts of power. Hence, one standard economic model is
46. By reducing purchases from Qc to Qb, the monopsonist raises the value
of attaining the last unit of prod- GRAPH 3
uct from Pc to v, but buys it at Price
Pb, based on the seller's supply
curve. The area (b+c) repre- S
sents the cost saved by not
purchasing Qb to Qc units; area
a is the value lost. The area d
represents the addition to prof-
its from paying only Pb for Qb V
units of the product. Since d a
is greater than a, there is a Pc ------- --
net profit from restricting
purchases. X
"/''' c D=MRP
Qb Q: Quantity
47. In economics, market power or monopoly power is the ability of a seller
to influence the price of its product, e.g., any slope on a demand curve. Pure
competition is the only market structure in which sellers have no market power.
F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 11
(2d ed. 1980). Market power in vertical supply situations arises in essentially
three contexts. One is the structural monopoly/monopsony context with which
antitrust law deals. The second context is in markets in which "ex post small
numbers opportunism" may occur-where there are many firms, but after indi-
vidual agreements are made, individual firms may take advantage of each other
in violation of the agreed upon terms. The third context is the situation in
which, because of the problems occasioned by one of the two previous situa-
tions, firms find it advantageous to vertically merge. Klein, Crawford, & Alchian,
supra note 15, at 297-98 (quoting and citing 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIER-
ARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-30 (1975)).
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referred to as "monopolistic competition. ' 48 The use of these
terms in economics is free of value judgment. In some cases, the
existence of monopoly power is even facilitated by statute and
considered to be positive, e.g., the power that accrues to the
holder of the typical patent.49
When either monopoly power or monopsony power is exer-
cised in the input or wholesale market, the effect on consumers is
identical-prices rise and the availability of the product falls.50
This is because consumers have downward sloping demand
curves. For example, if dairy farmers combined to exercise mo-
nopoly power and raised the price of milk, their wholesale cus-
tomers, the milk processors, would purchase less milk.
Processors would then have less milk to offer to consumers and, if
the consumer demand curve is downward sloping, the consumer
price would rise. Conversely, if processors drive down the price
they pay for raw milk, this also raises consumer prices. This re-
sult occurs because, in the face of lower prices, farmers will curtail
output, which leaves processors with less supply for consumers,
and which will drive up the consumer price. 51
"Countervailing power" neutralizes monopoly or monop-
sony power and results in lower consumer prices. When buyers
have monopsony power, increasing countervailing power 52 in the
hands of the sellers enables them to raise the selling price. The
48. E.H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th
ed. 1965). The thesis of this book is that both monopolistic and competitive
forces combine to determine prices, and therefore the hybrid theory of monopo-
listic competition offers an illuminating approach to the study of the price
system.
49. See R.C. LIPSEY & P.O. STEINER, supra note 7, at 290. A patent is a grant
of some privilege, property, or authority by a government. Id. In the United
States it is an exclusive grant to market, produce, and use for seventeen years.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). Patent laws are thought to provide an incentive for
innovation by granting a temporary monopoly to the innovator, thereby length-
ening the short-run period during which super-normal profits can be earned.
R.C. LIPSEY & P.O. STEINER, supra note 7, at 290.
50. This presumes that the state of competition in other markets remains
unaltered and that only one side, either buyer or seller, is given power. There
has been some confusion in the literature because some authors alter competi-
tion in more than one market at a time. See, e.g., Fellner, "Competitive" Output in
Bilateral Monopoly, 64 Q.J. ECON. 648-50 (1950); Morgan, Reply, 64 Q.J. ECON.
650-52 (1950). Scherer discusses this effect on consumers under two different
(but unaltered) states of processor final product competition. F.M. SCHERER,
supra note 47, at 299-301, 306-07 (AVP on page 300 is equal to firm MRP in long
run equilibrium; MRP on page 300 is curve marginal to that).
51. For a discussion of the relationship between consumer prices and pro-
ducer prices in connection with countervailing power, see infra note 54.
52. For a discussion of monopsony power and its relation to consumer
prices, see infra note 54.
[Vol. 3 1: p. 183
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end result of this is to lower consumer prices because a greater
quantity is transacted.53 This continues until the price to the sell-
ers and that paid by consumers reach the "competitive" 54 level.
55
As the sellers' power reaches the point where it exceeds that of
53. Industrial contracts often specify both price and quantity. In a bilateral
monopoly, such quantity contracts should, when practical, be set at the quantity
for which market cost equals marginal revenue product (MC = MRP), even if
there is supervailing power. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 300; Mach-
lup & Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27
ECONOMICA 101 (1960). For a further discussion of the issue of practicality of
contracts, see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 47.
This is not true in agriculture. Nicholls noted that for bilateral monopoly in
agriculture the industrial type of quantity contract is less likely to occur. See W.
NICHOLLS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION WITHIN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES 166-78
(1941). See also Nicholls, Book Review, J. POL. ECON. 82 (1943) (reviewing W.
NICHOLLS, A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION WITH SPECIAL
APPLICATION TO THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES (1941) (extension of theory of
imperfect competition)). Essentially, aggregation of sellers into a collective or-
ganization, e.g., a cooperative or a union, will generally result in agreements
which quote price and then leave buyers and sellers to transact as much as they
wish, or can, at that price. N.B. A "full supply" contract is not a quantity con-
tract of the type mentioned here because it does not specify total quantity, but
merely the proportion of total quantity that will be obtained from some source.
Further, if there are oligopoly or oligopsony elements in a market (rather than
pure monopoly and monopsony), again fixed quantity contracts are less likely.
See Machlup & Taber, supra, at 112. Under these conditions it is generally ac-
cepted that if the agreed price is less than the competitive price, the quantity
transacted will be what the sellers are willing to supply at this price (i.e., on the
supply curve). Similarly, if price is above the competitive price, the quantity will
be determined from the demand curve. Much of what has been called the "inde-
terminacy" (see, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 299) of bilateral monopoly
depends upon what assumptions are involved; what power relationships are in
other markets and whether these are being changed in the model (see supra note
50); what information the transactors have (see supra note 50); or whether agree-
ments are price quotes, or also have specified quantity terms. For agriculture,
and dairy in particular, the typical arrangement is of the price quote variety,
hence part of the "indeterminancy" is eliminated. The remaining in-
determinancy is primarily what price will be selected, i.e., countervailing or
supervailing, which, in turn, will determine quantity.
54. The effect of farmer countervailing power can be illustrated by super-
imposing the consumer demand curve (d) and processor demand curve (D) on
the same graph: S represents the farmers' supply curve. Then Pc, where S=D,
is the competitive price to the farmer. See supra note 45. The term "competitive
price" in this paper is used interchangeably with "countervailing price," as the
countervailing price is that which occurs with the establishment of competition
in the input market if the degree of competition is unaltered elsewhere. This
graph assumes, for ease of conceptualization, that one unit of input is required
to produce one unit of output. The precise relationship between D and d (e.g.,
converging, diverging, or parallel) depends upon various factors such as the de-
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the buyers, i.e., when they begin to supervail56 buyer power,
prices to sellers continue to rise. However, consumer prices also
rise, as the quantity of available product decreases.57 Thus, one
gree of processor competition in resale, whether the model is for short run or
long run, potential competition GRAPH 4
in resale, technology for produc-
ing final product, etc. Regard- Price
less, when processors have
monopsony power, Qb will be
bought from farmers at Pb and pb . ... S
resold to consumers at pb. As
farmers develop countervailing PC -
power, they can push their price
up the supply curve. As buyers
lose their supervailing power,
they purchase as much as the Psellers will supply at any price, P!r'
as long as their demand at that
price (D) is not fully satisfied. Pb------As farmers increase their price d
(below Pc) buyers purchase
more and resell more. Then the
quantity sold to consumers in-
creases and consumer prices de- D
crease. This continues to the
countervailing point, where mo-
nopsony power is neutralized at Qb Qc Quantity
which Qc will be purchased from farmers at Pc and bought by consumers at pc.
55. This is another area in which the literature evidences confusion because
different authors have addressed different problems, often with implicit assump-
tions in their analyses. For a comprehensive review of the literature up to 1960,
see Machlup & Taber, supra note 53. Machlup and Taber even refer to what is
here called a "competitive" result as a "monopoly" result. Id. at 111. This fol-
lows a semantic jump from a mathematically equivalent problem and is justified
in their context by the assumption that the input buyer is a monopolistic seller
for final product. Hence, once the seller has countervailed, the buyer becomes
only a "simple monopolist" rather than one which exploits monopsony as well.
This distinction based upon other markets is a source of semantic confusion
between Fellner, supra note 50, and Morgan, supra note 50. Scherer reserves the
term "competitive" for removal of not only all input buyer and seller power
(MRP = MC) but also the removal of the buyer's final product market power.
F.M. SCHERER, supra, note 47, at 300, 306. He uses the term "countervailing"
where MRP = MC. Id. The discussions in Fellner, Prices and Wages under Bilateral
Monopoly, 61 Qj. EcoN. 503, 527 (1947) (how bilateral monopoly affects price
and wages); Morgan, Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output, 63 OJ. EcON.
34 (1949); Fellner, supra note 50; and Morgan, supra note 50, center on which
term should apply. If one considers the effects of competition in an input mar-
ket and varies only the degree of competition in that market alone, then the
condition MC = MRP reflects competitive equilibrium in that market. Scherer's
use of AVP follows Morgan. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 306-07
(Scherer's AVP is equal to firm MRP). Put in another fashion, MC = MRP will
occur if neither buyer nor seller tries to restrict output or purchases in order to
induce the other party to alter price (i.e., if they both act as "price takers").
56. For a definition of supervailing power, see supra note 8.
57. When sellers impose higher prices, but prices remain below Pc, buyers
will be willing to purchase as much as they can at such prices; their demand at
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cost of supervailing power is higher consumer prices.
The foregoing economic analysis demonstrates Congress' ra-
tionale and expectations in allowing farmers to gain counter-
vailing power. 58 In some markets, individual farmers faced
buyers with monopsony power. Middlemen were able to restrict
purchases to suppress the price down the supply curve. Congress
intended to allow sellers to combine forces so that they would be
able to exert pressure up the supply curve, increasing both farmer
prices and the quantity sold. The effect of monopsony power
would decline until it was canceled out by the sellers' counter-
vailing power. At that point both quantity and price would be at
the competitive level. Equally important, consumers would also
benefit from enabling the sellers to countervail buyer power be-
cause there would be more product on the market at a lower
price.
2. Undue Price Enhancement
While Congress believed that countervailing buyer power
was a legitimate goal for farmer cooperatives, achievement of
supervailing power was not. Nonetheless, control over supply to
a market, a necessary ingredient of supervailing power, was an
express goal of some of the most vigorous proponents of the co-
operative exemption. 59 This created a danger that the means
chosen to create countervailing power might actually lead to the
creation of supervailing power. Though most members of Con-
gress doubted that supervailing power could actually be achieved
in agriculture, 60 some economists recognized the need for
caution:
There is, however, here, as in other large-scale business
organizations, the possibility that the mere size and
weight of the centralized control might be used to domi-
nate the market and to cause prices to take on a monop-
these prices exceeds the available supply. However, if the sellers impose a price
above Pc, buyers do not demand as much as Qc at these prices. As buyers buy
less product, they will have less final product to sell to consumers, driving the
consumer price up as well. For a discussion of the relation of demand and price,
see infra note 64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relationships
discussed in this footnote, see supra note 54.
58. See 62 CONG. REC. 2059 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper) (noting in-
terrelatipn of price, supply, and demand).
59. E.G. NOURSE, supra note 16, at 160-63 (cooperatives attempted to con-
trol supply).
60. For a discussion of the congressional view on this subject, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
1986]
19
Baumer et al.: Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the A
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
202 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 183
olistic character.... It is clearly evident .... that when a
co-operative pool acquires the power and claims the
right to withhold a product from market, either tempo-
rarily or permanently, it begins to move out of the
clearly lighted area of distributive efficiency into a twi-
light zone of market control in which public opinion is
pretty sure to assert its right to examine, and possibly to
restrict market adjustment or manipulative activities. 6 '
In anticipation of this potential problem, Congress made it
clear, in section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act, that cooperatives
were not allowed to unduly enhance prices. While the legislative
history lacks precise economic models by which undue price en-
hancement can be determined,6 2 a definition can be derived
based on Congress' statements of what the Act was intended to
accomplish and what it was intended to prevent.6 3 The key to
61. E.G. NOURSE, supra note 16, at 163-64.
62. Nor has a formulation been developed through litigation. The Secre-
tary of Agriculture has yet to bring an action against a cooperative for undue
price enhancement. Since the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act, there have
been only seven United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) investigations
of possible undue price enhancement. A.C. MANCHESTER, THE STATUS OF MAR-
KETING COOPERATIVES UNDER ANTITRUST LAW 47 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Eco-
nomic Research Serv. 1982); Folsom, Antitrust Enforcement Under the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Commerce, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1634-35 (1980).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); supra notes 33-39
and accompanying text. Based on the legislative history cited herein, some com-
mentators have suggested that undue price enhancement is too vague a concept
to define. For a discussion of this theory, see Note, supra note 9. Others have
attempted to define it, but differ widely in the factors to be considered and the
conclusions to be drawn therefrom. For views other than those of the authors
herein, see, e.g., Alagia, Federal Milk Marketing Orders: A Fair Return to the Dairy
Farmer is Not Undue Price Enhancement, 21 S. DAK. L. REV. 591 (1976) (market is
capable of determining fair price); Folsom, supra note 62. Compare E.V. JESSE &
A.C. JOHNSON, MARKETING COOPERATIVES AND UNDUE PRICE ENHANCEMENT: A
THEORETICAL PRESPECTIVE (N.C. Project 117, Working Paper Series, WP-46
1980) (analysis of when cooperative may raise prices) with E.V. JESSE, A.C.JoHN-
SON, & B.W. MARION, INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING SECTION 2 OF THE CAPPER-
VOLSTEAD ACT (N.C. Project 117, Working Paper Series, WP-51 1981) (history
and background of § 2).
The USDA itself has posed no fewer than four different definitions of undue
price enhancement. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, UNDUE PRICE EN-
HANCEMENT BY AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES-CRITERIA, MONITORING, EN-
FORCEMENT (1979) (final Report of the Capper-Volstead Study Committee)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT] (undue price enhancement exists where
farmer cooperative has managed to go beyond level of equality in market power
by charging prices that significantly exceed level associated with equality of mar-
ket power); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONSE TO NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES § 4a (1978) (undue price
enhancement is existence of prices higher than those which would result from
market structure including cooperative which did not commit acts of monopoli-
zation or restraint of trade); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE QUESTION OF UN-
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understanding undue price enhancement lies in the distinction
between countervailing power and supervailing power. Counter-
vailing power pushes the price to farmers up the supply curve to-
ward the competitive level. The point at which monopsony power
is completely neutralized (countervailed) is the competitive point.
The competitive amount is sold at the competitive price. Once
farmers achieve supervailing power, they push the price up the
demand curve and the quantity sold declines. Less product is
then sold to consumers, and at a higher price. These enhanced
prices are not necessitated by countervailing the monopsony
power of processors, but are the direct result of supervailing
power. Simply put, prices are unduly enhanced when they exceed
the level that corresponds to equality of bargaining power. Prices
that result from supervailing power are unduly enhanced.64 Ap-
plication of this rule of reason to cooperative price fixing or other
concerted activity should not be any more difficult or complicated
than the application of other economic principles to market be-
DUE PRICE ENHANCEMENT BY MILK COOPERATIVES (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 REPORT] (undue price enhancement is existence of prices higher than war-
ranted by economic conditions); A.C. MANCHESTER, supra note 62, at 38. Ac-
cording to Manchester's USDA publication, the price charged by the cooperative
must exceed that which would exist if a market included a cooperative of the
same size and type which did not
engage in acts of monopoliza- GRAPH 5
tion or restraint of trade. Id. A
cooperative may permissibly en- Price
hance price to something more
than the price which would exist
without a cooperative and some- pm S
thing less than that which could 's
be obtained by a cooperative PC
with 100% of the market facing
atomistic buyers. This article Pm
will not attempt to refute each
and every approach suggested in
the literature, but, rather, will Pc---------i.--- d
propose and defend its own I
position. /
64. Using the same graph
discussed supra at note 54, both
supervailing power and undue I
price enhancement can be st D
demonstrated. When farmer
monopoly power increases be-
yond the countervailing point 0Qm Q c Quantity
(Qc sold at Pc to processors and
at pc to consumers), the farmer price is pushed up the D curve in the direction of
Pm. Quantity is reduced toward Qm and consumer prices climb. Any price
above Pc (at Qc) is the result of supervailing power and thus is an unduly en-
hanced price.
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havior in antitrust cases. 65 To some extent, courts already deal
with the concept of undue price enhancement when they assess
the damages caused by an illegal price fixing agreement. 66
II. COOPERATIVES IN TODAY'S DAIRY INDUSTRY
Since the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act, regulatory and
technological developments have contributed to a radical change
in the nature and structure of agricultural markets. Through an
examination of the dairy industry, it will be shown that some co-
operatives have achieved significant market power which
supervails buyer power and unduly enhances prices. Proper anal-
ysis of the geographic scope of markets and the relationship be-
tween market share and market power demonstrates the need to
prune cooperative power in some markets.
A. Changes in Regulation and Technology
Since the Depression, the Secretary of Agriculture has gained
a measure of influence over the structure of agricultural markets.
Congress has charged the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) with administration of various price enhancing
schemes which, in addition to raising individual farmers' incomes,
further augment cooperative power. Cooperatives' exploitation
of the regulatory system has often been a significant factor in
their achieving supervailing power. 67
In the early 1900's local sanitary requirements caused an in-
crease in the cost of producing milk for fluid consumption. 68 For
65. Cf 1979 REPORT, supra note 63, at 8 (problem of determining when
prices have been unduly enhanced will be neither more nor less complicated
than use of any other competitive price norm, A.C. MANCHESTER, supra note 62,
at 25 (undue price enhancement should be judged under rule of reason).
66. For a discussion of the complexities involved in proving a Sherman Act
violation, see E. GELLHORN, supra note 43, at 233-40.
67. Some commentators have suggested that federal regulation of agricul-
ture, via governmentally sanctioned, industry-wide restrictive agreements, may
have an even greater price enhancing effect than private anticompetitive behav-
ior by cooperatives. See, e.g., A. Masson, The Economic Effects of Marketing Orders, in
F. LIPSON & C. BATrERTON, STAFF REPORT ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 152
(Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission 1975) (governmental regu-
lation facilitates establishment and maintenance of cooperative dominance and
inflated prices). Regardless of the desirability of regulatory overhaul, anticom-
petitive activity carried on under the cover of the marketing orders can, and
should, be prosecuted under the antitrust laws. Id. Cf Marketing Assistance
Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1023-24 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) (activities designed to achieve monopoly position even if under cover
of federal milk order may still violate antitrust laws).
68. By 1937, typical sanitary regulations covered not only minimum chemi-
cal requirements and maximum bacteria count, but also the type of barn floor-
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farmers to invest in specialized assets for the production of Grade
A milk,69 they needed to charge a higher price than Grade B milk
commanded in order to recoup their costs. However, whenever
the supply of Grade A milk exceeded the demand for fluid milk,
the excess had to be sold for manufacturing use, at Grade B
prices. In times of surplus, competition tended to drive all Grade
A prices down to Grade B levels. The competitive solution, an
annual price cycle for Grade A milk, was an imperfect way of com-
pensating farmers for investment in Grade A facilities. Depend-
ing upon farm and market conditions, in some years this might
overcompensate and in other years undercompensate, making in-
vestment in Grade A facilities a risky proposition. Farmers de-
sired to eliminate this risk and in some markets cooperatives were
able to institute classified pricing schemes under which farmers
would be paid higher prices for milk which actually went into fluid
use.
70
The Depression brought collapse in the demand for milk.71
Despite significantly lower Grade A prices, excess Grade A milk
abounded, forcing prices down to Grade B levels. Several mar-
kets exploded into violent warfare between buyers and sellers.
Some buyers reneged on classified pricing agreements while
others used "lock-outs" to force Grade A prices to the Grade B
level, and others cheated on weights and tests. Some producers
engaged in "strikes," setting up roadblocks to keep out compet-
ing milk in order to force the Grade A price above that of Grade
B. 72
ing, milk-house construction, manure disposal, innoculation of herds, cooling
temperature, etc. E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12, at 122; Harris, supra
note 15, at 12-18.
69. Only Grade A milk, milk which met the sanitary standards, could be put
to fluid use. Grade B milk could only be used in manufacturing.
70. R. FONES, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 29. Under "blend
price" payment plans, buyers were charged different prices based on the milk's
actual use. The cooperative collected all milk payments and remitted to each
Grade A farmer the average (blend) per gallon (or hundred weight, cwt.) price,
regardless of the ultimate disposition of the particular farmer's milk. Under
"base-surplus" systems, each farmer was allocated a quota of milk production
for which the Grade A price would be paid. Any amount produced in excess of
the "base" received the lower Grade B price. H.R. Doc. No. 152, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-29 (1935). For an overview of the development of classified milk
pricing, see R. FONES, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 25-30; E.
GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12, at 27.
71. See A. KORPELA, supra note 13, at 15, 18 (demand for milk and dairy
products contracted dramatically).
72. SeeJ. BLACK, THE DAIRY INDUSTRY AND THE AAA 127 (1935) (recounting
Chicago milk strike of 1934); Harris, supra note 15 at 12-13; Kessel, Economic
Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets, 10J.L. & ECON. 51, 52 (1967) (setting
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1. Classified Pricing
In order to restore orderly marketing, assure an adequate
supply of milk, and raise farmers' income, Congress passed the
Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act (AMAA) in 1937. 73 The
two major features of the AMAA that are relevant to this article
are the classified pricing scheme and the marketing order system.
Under classified pricing, Grade A milk is divided into two classes.
Class I is milk that actually goes into fluid uses and Class II is the
surplus, which goes into manufacturing uses in competition with
Grade B milk.7 4 A minimum price for Class I milk is set by regu-
lation and the Class II milk is sold at the lower, Grade B price.
Class I and Class II revenues are pooled and each Grade A farmer
receives a "blend price," which is the average per hundred weight
price for all Grade A milk sales. 75
This classification system raises the incomes of Grade A
farmers by exploiting demand elasticities. 76 Class I demand is
relatively inelastic, so increased Class I prices raise total revenues.
Class II demand is elastic, so the Class II sale of any milk forced
out of fluid use by the higher Class I price raises total revenues
yet again. This double effect raises total revenues, and hence the
farmers' price, for each additional quantity sold. 77 Farmers can
forth willingness of producer groups to employ milk strikes and violence to af-
fect unstable milk prices); D.L. Baumer, Federal Regulation of the Diary Indus-
try: Costs, Benefits, and Legal Constraints, 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, 1980)
(available at Main Library, University of Virginia) (citing instances of milk
strikes, lockouts, and violence in the 1930's as a result of milk price instability).
73. Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act, ch. 296, § 3, 50 Stat. 248
(1937) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 671-674 (1982)). Many of the features of the
AMAA had been contained in The Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933,
Pub. L. No. 10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624
(1982)). The AMAA also provides for the arbitration, with the consent of the
parties, of disputes concerning milk if the Secretary of Agriculture finds that the
policy of the AMAA (restoring orderly marketing) would be adversely affected
by such disputes. 7 U.S.C. § 641 (1982). The AMAA further leaves unaffected
those marketing agreements, licenses, orders, and other provisions enacted
under the Agriculture Adjustment Act. Id. §§ 673-674.
74. See 7 U.S.C. § 608 (1982) (breakdown of federal Milk Orders and proce-
dures for determining classification of milk and milk products). More classes are
sometimes designated, but all non-Class I milk is treated similarly and often
called Class II milk. See infra note 77.
75. For a discussion of the blend price and its effect upon the marketplace,
see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
76. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 43, at 54-55.
77. When demand is inelastic, raising price or reducing quantity will raise
total revenues because the percentage increase in price exceeds the percentage
decrease in quantity sold. When demand is elastic, manipulation of price or
quantity has the opposite effect. The demand for Class II milk will have greater
elasticity: (a) the more consumers' demand for manufactured milk products is
206 [Vol. 3 1: p. 183
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potentially use classified pricing either to countervail or to
supervail buyer power. 78 Classified pricing can be used to
supervail buyer power without controlling the total supply of
milk. Simply by controlling the supply to the Class I market a
cooperative can achieve a supervailing price in this Class I market.
It can then channel the excess into Class II markets and achieve a
net gain for its members. 79 Surplus Grade A milk beyond the
reserves reasonably necessary to meet unanticipated market con-
ditions is a clear sign that prices are the consequence of supervail-
ing power.8 0
2. The Federal Order System
The Federal Order System, the other important aspect of the
AMAA, applies classified pricing to specified geographic markets,
or "Orders." 81 The "allocation provisions" 82 and "compensa-
elastic; (b) the greater the supply and supply elasticity of Grade B milk; and
(c) the more important price supports are in determining milk prices. See Ip-
polito & Masson, The Social Cost of Government Regulation of Milk, 21 J.L. & EcoN.
33 (1978). On a national basis, Class II demand may not always be elastic. But
local Class II demand may be elastic due to inter-local competition of butter and
cheese products. Furthermore, nationally, all blend prices can rise even if Class
II demand is not elastic. All that is required is that the milk diverted from Class
I have a lower marginal revenue in Class I than in Class II, a condition which
unambiguously exists. It should also be noted that what is referred to here as
Class II milk has, at times, been referred to or sub-designated as Class III, Class
IV, etc. All experts agree, however, that non-Class I milk is, in effect, closer to
Class II than Class I. For consistency and ease of explication, only the Class
I/Class II distinction will be made here. For contrasting views on classified pric-
ing, see Harris, supra note 15; Ippolito & Masson, supra; Kessel, supra note 72.
78. E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12, at 29-31; Harris, supra note 15,
at 5.
79. For a discussion of the power of dairy cooperatives to control supply in
current markets, see infra notes 134-72 and accompanying text.
80. E. GAUMNITZ & 0. REED, supra note 12, at 108-26. Gaumnitz and Reed
were two agricultural economists who worked on the institution of the Federal
Order classified pricing system. They were careful to avoid the pejorative, using
terms such as "complex competition" in place of "monopolistic competition,"
id. at 75 n.84, and "arbitrary pricing" instead of "monopoly pricing," id. at 108,
or our "supervailing pricing." Gaumnitz and Reed's argument is developed
over the entire book and demonstrates that when Grade A milk supply expands
beyond demand plus "necessary reserve," buyer power has been more than
countervailed; Class I prices are too high for the public interest; and the Govern-
ment should find it imperative to reduce prices because of supplies "from new
sources." See id. at 108-26, 129, 161, 177; see also id. at 131 n.24, 158 (setting
forth some caveats).
81. Whether a handler (buyer) is subject to one Order or another depends
on the area in which it makes most of its Class I sales. Within an Order, a
minimum Class I price is prescribed which partially takes into account the cost of
transporting milk from logical alternative sources.
82. "Allocation provisions" determine the minimum prices to be paid when
a buyer purchases bulk milk from handlers regulated by other Orders. Roughly,
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tory payments"83 provisions discriminate against handlers who go
outside their Order for raw milk. This affects the size of the area
to which a buyer may reasonably turn for alternative sources of
supply.84 For cooperatives, the costs of these provisions decline
as their market shares are greater, so most long distance move-
ments of raw Grade A milk are only economically feasible for co-
a buyer must pay the prevailing Federal Order prices at the location of the other
handler plus transport costs (and any cooperative premium and any seller profit
for this milk). If the milk is allocated as Class I milk, the Federal Order price at
the originating handler's location may be lower than at the buyer's location.
This price difference will be at least offset, however, by transportation costs,
making the federally required cost of the imported Class I milk at least as high as
that of local Class I milk unless the selling handler volunteers to take a loss on
the shipment. Milk allocated to Class II will generally not have a lower price in
any other location, so the federally required payment is no lower, whereas trans-
port costs must be added. Thus, the federally required cost of Class II milk from
outside the buyer's Order will be substantially greater than for local Class II milk
(again, unless the seller volunteers to take a loss on the sale). The "allocation
provision" sets the maximum amount eligible for the preferred Class I designa-
tion. Often, much of the milk is "down allocated" to the more costly Class II. A
similar provision applies for milk from a handler who is not regulated under any
federal order. Under some conditions a buyer can avoid the allocation provi-
sions by purchasing directly from distant farmers. However, as a practical mat-
ter, milk that is to be shipped any great distance (e.g., more than 150 or 200
miles, depending on time, terrain, temperature, etc.) is generally best
"reloaded" from farm pickup tankers through refrigeration stations to over-the-
road haulers. In practice, reloading will generally subject the milk to point-of-
origin regulation, and hence to allocation provisions.
83. "Compensatory payments" are payments that must be made to produ-
cers within an Order for any Class I milk imported from other sources not regu-
lated by a Federal Order. Thus, it is a kind of "import tax." Included in this
category are areas in which there is no regulation and areas in which there is
state regulation but no federal regulation.
84. The allocation and compensatory payments provisions combine to op-
erate as a "tax" on imported milk. The proceeds of the "tax" are redistributed
in a fashion that discriminates in favor of the imports of any large cooperatives
within the Order. The proceeds of the compensatory payments are distributed
to the producers in proportion to their market shares within the Order. Thus if
a cooperative with 90% of the market in an Order imports milk, 90% of the
"tax" it pays gets remitted to it; a small cooperative with only 10% of the market
gets back only 10% of the "import tax" it pays; a handler pays the "tax" and
gets nothing back. The implicit tax on outside milk that is allocated "down" to
Class II converts to an implicit subsidy as local milk is "promoted" to Class I.
R.T. Masson & Eisenstat, Welfare Impacts of Milk Orders and the Antitrust Immunities
for Cooperatives, 62 AM.J. AGR. ECON. 270 (1980). For a more detailed discussion
of the mechanics by which milk produced outside a Federal Order is subject to
discrimination, see J. HAMMOND, B. BUXTON & C. THRAEN, POTENTIAL IMPACTS
OF RECONSTITUTED MILK ON REGIONAL PRICES, UTILIZATION, AND PRODUCTION
20-23 (Agricultural Experiment Station, Univ. of Minn. 1979) (discussing pric-
ing orders and possible discrimination); AGRICULTURAL MKT. SERV., DAIRY Div.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS IN FEDERAL MILK
MARKETING ORDERS 8 (1981). Other Federal Order provisions, such as "supply
plant qualification" requirements, "diversion" requirements and "point of pric-
ing provisions," complement the provisions discussed above in limiting the
availability of outside milk as a reasonable alternative for processors.
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operatives with large market shares in the receiving order.85
Some locality restrictions are necessary in order for the sys-
tem to function smoothly. Otherwise, distant suppliers might sell
milk to local processors at a price below the minimum that local
producers are permitted to charge, thus undermining the whole
scheme.8 6 However, the ability to erect barriers, once provided,
can be exploited. In practice, these Market Order provisions as-
sure that almost all buyers (with the exception of a large coopera-
tive) must pay substantially more than the local Order price for
milk purchased from distant sources. Market Order provisions,
though promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, must be
voted upon by the producers within the Order. Indeed, the local
cooperatives frequently propose the provisions of the Order and
a cooperative is permitted to "block vote" for its member produ-
cers.8 7 Thus, the local bias inherent in the system becomes mag-
nified. The effect is that submarkets are determined by regulatory
jurisdictions, although, since the barriers are imperfect, wider ge-
ographic markets may become relevant for some analytical
purposes.88
85. See supra note 84. Importation may also occur where, through monop-
oly power or shortages, the local Class I and Class II prices are so high that they
exceed the cost of outside purchases plus the "tax" plus transport. It may also
occur where a processor is cut off by local producers and is forced to look
outside the Order to meet its sales commitments. See Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v.
Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (defendant milk marketing
association refused to sell to plaintiff processor, thereby forcing plaintiff to
purchase milk outside Order), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
86. The purpose of the Federal Order system is to encourage regular and
stable local supply relationships between farmers and processors. It is designed
to keep processors from pressuring producers to cut their prices under the
threat of importing milk from distant markets and to keep distant producers
from dumping their occasional surpluses into the Order and depressing prices.
87. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(12) (1982) (few issues upon which block voting is not
permitted). Today, the largest cooperative in almost every Order has in excess
of 50% of the market-a majority of the votes. For a discussion of how some
cooperatives have used the Federal Order system to their advantage, see A. Mas-
son, supra note 67, at 152-56.
88. Two factors tend to moderate barriers in some areas or at some times:
(1) large supplies of milk located within easy shipping distance (e.g., less than
150 miles) of more than one Federal Order market center; (2) short supplies of
local Grade A milk (regulatory barriers are intentionally lowered and the cost
disadvantage is not great when over 95% of the local milk is used for Class I). A
third factor in some areas is surpluses of state-regulated milk under base-surplus
plans in nearby locations. Where these supplies are large and persistent how-
ever, additional regulatory barriers may be created. For a further discussion of
geographic markets, see infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
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3. Price Supports
After passing several temporary measures, Congress in 1949
enacted a permanent price support system for the dairy indus-
try. 89 Under this program, milk prices are raised to some percent
of "parity" 90  through Commodity Credit Corporation 9'
purchases of butter, milk powder, cheese, and other manufac-
tured dairy products. One function of the system is to moderate
price fluctuations, especially the natural decline during spring-
time when production is greatest. The plan is also designed to
raise farmer income by increasing the price of milk.
4. Technological Advances
Technological advances have bolstered the market power en-
hancing effects of regulation. On-farm refrigeration facilities al-
low for longer farm storage and insulated transportation and
refrigerated storage facilities lengthen the amount of time milk
can be held before processing. 92 Transportation improvements
enable a regional cooperative to move milk great distances with-
out spoiling.93 Unlike the 1920's when surplus milk might gain
little salvage value through on-farm churning, under the Federal
Order system, surplus milk processed into cheese receives the
same blend price as the milk processed for fluid uses.
B. Cooperative Markets and Market Shares
Since 1950, cooperative growth has been tremendous, result-
ing in increased concentration and surging market power. Coop-
eratives are now a vital force in the dairy industry.94 In the
absence of direct evidence, 95 market power can be inferred from a
89. Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1054 (1949)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1468 (1982)). See S. REP. No. 1130,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2407
(purpose of Act is to stabilize prices of agricultural commodities).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982). The parity price is meant to give the farmer
the same purchasing power he had during some chosen base period.
91. Id. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was formed for the pur-
pose of stabilizing, supporting, and protecting farm income and prices.
92. See A. KORPELA, supra note 13, at 3 (today's farmers are much more effi-
cient due to better technology).
93. In addition, a large cooperative does not suffer much deterrence in the
face of the "tax" on inter-order shipments. For a further discussion of inter-
order barriers, see supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of cooperatives' market power, see infra notes 128-71
and accompanying text.
95. Market power is power over price and, if wielded, gives high margins:
(Price-Marginal Cost)/Price. Market power is demonstrated if one can prove
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cooperative's behavior in the market 96 or from the size of a coop-
erative's share of the market. Proper analysis of market share and
its relationship to market power requires at the outset a definition
of the market in which a cooperative operates. Some of the judi-
cial refusals to invoke the antitrust laws against cooperatives have
been rooted in erroneous market definitions resulting in a misap-
prehension of the level of cooperative market power. 97
1. Defining the Market
For antitrust purposes, a market consists of a group of prod-
ucts and an associated geographic area such that (in the absence
of new entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the
sales of those products in that area could increase its profits
through a small but significant and non-transitory increase in
price (above prevailing or likely future levels).98 There are two
aspects of a market which must be considered: (1) the product(s)
within the market; and (2) the geographical boundaries of the
that (P-MC)/P is high and sustained. In economic terms, this is the best evi-
dence of market power, and where present, should moot the need for indirect
evidence such as market behavior and market share. See R.A. POSNER, ArT-
TRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 125 (1976). As stated by Posner:
If we knew the elasticity of demand facing a group of sellers, it would
be redundant to ask whether the group constituted an economically
meaningful market. The effect of other sellers on the ability of the
members of the group to collude effectively would be automatically
registered.... It is only because we lack confidence in our ability to
measure elasticities ... that we have to define markets instead.
Id.
96. For a discussion of behavioral indicia of market power in the dairy in-
dustry, see infra notes 147-72 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of proper market definition, see infra notes 98-118 and
accompanying text.
98. U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4501 (1985). See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANrITRUST 41
(1977):
To define a market in product and geographic terms is to say that if
prices were appreciably raised or volume appreciably curtailed for the
product within a given area, while demand held constant, supply from
other sources could not be expected to enter promptly enough and in
large enough amounts to restore the old price or volume. If sufficient
supply would promptly enter from other geographic areas, then the
"defined market" is not wide enough in geographic terms; if sufficient
supply would promptly enter in the form of products made by other
producers which had not been included in the product market as de-
fined, then the market would not be wide enough in defined product
terms. A "relevant market," then, is the narrowest market which is
wide enough so that products from adjacent areas or from other produ-
cers in the same area cannot compete on substantial parity with those
included in the market.
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market. 99 In the dairy industry, definition of the relevant product
99. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (area of
effective competition must be determined by reference to product and geo-
graphic markets). In economic analysis, product market definition and geo-
graphic market delineation are two sides of the same coin. Once it is recognized
that a market is smaller than the entire universe, market definition becomes a
matter of line drawing. In a purely theoretical economic market, the products of
the competing sellers are both undifferentiated and at a single location. See A.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF STATIONARY STATES 78 (1935). Buyers will pair with
sellers on the basis of lowest price. When prices are equalized, buyers will have
no preferences among sellers and pairing will be random. Changes in prices
outside the market will have a minimal effect on the pairing of sellers and buyers
within the market. Conversely, changes within the market would have an imme-
diate and significant impact on the units within that market. Id.
A. Marshall proposes a somewhat less restrictive definition of a theoretical
market:
Thus the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency
for the same price to be paid for the same thing at all parts of the mar-
ket: but of course if the market is large, allowance must be made for
the expense of delivering the goods to different purchasers....
A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 325 (1920).
In Marshall's terms, the perfect market is a chain linking of perfect substi-
tutes, within a "gap," to other goods. For Washington, D.C., and Denver to be
in the same market would require a base area (i.e., somewhere in the Mid-West)
and the price in Denver would be Mid-West plus transport and likewise in Wash-
ington, D.C. Hence, a 10-cent price rise in Denver which is not also associated
with a 10-cent rise in both the Mid-West and Washington, D.C., is inconsistent
with all three cities being in the same market. Real world markets do not fit the
theoretical definitions exactly, since products are differentiated in characteristics
and in space. Thus, economists have tried to derive "common sense devices" to
take into account the vagaries of real markets, such as marked gaps in the chain
of substitutes. F.M. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 60.
This "chain of substitutes" theory is attributed to Joan Robinson. J. ROBIN-
SON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 5 (1933). Under this rubric, if
gasoline stations A through Z were spaced along a highway every two miles, in
determining whether A and Z are in the same market, one looks at A's actions to
see whether they have an effect on B, at B's actions to see whether they affect C,
and so on, until Y's actions are examined for their effect on Z. If each is ob-
served to have a significant effect on its neighbor there are no "breaks" in the
chain between A and Z and they are said to be in the same market. It is immate-
rial to this approach whether a 10-cent change in A's price would have an appre-
ciable influence on Z's business. They are said to be in the same market because
A and B are clearly linked, B and C are linked, etc. Robinson talked of the breaks
in terms of "cross-elasticities," a term that later became important in the devel-
opment of judicial market definitions.
Edward Mason noted that for applied work, the Robinsonian definition was
flawed in that it could, in many instances, combine in the same market firms
which had no competitive interaction. On the premise that two firms which had
no influence on each other should not be in the same market, he focused on a
seller of a product at a point in time and identified its competitors. The seller
plus competitors-zones of competitive interaction-constitute a market. Ma-
son, Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 61, 68-
69 (1939). For example, for the gasoline stations above, B may have competitive
interactions with only A and C; C with only B and D, etc. Thus, A-B-C might be
one market, while B-C-D might be another. Depending on the focus or purpose
of the inquiry, a firm may "be" in more than one market.
The Mason approach is similar to that adopted by the court in Tampa Elec-
[Vol. 31: p. 183
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market is relatively simple but defining the geographical bounds
is more complex.
a. Product Market
In antitrust litigation involving dairy cooperatives, courts
have generally ruled that Grade A milk constitutes a product mar-
ket.100 The courts have applied the "practical indicia" of markets
tric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). In Tampa, plaintiff, a pro-
ducer of electric energy, entered into a 20-year requirements contract with
defendant coal producer by which the defendant agreed to supply each year a
maximum total requirement of 2,250,000 tons. Id. at 322. The defendant sub-
sequently sought a declaration that its contract with the plaintiff violated § 3 of
the Clayton Act since, by the terms of the contract, it would supply amounts
exceeding the total consumption of coal in peninsular Florida. Id. at 323. In
rejecting the "quantitative substantiality" of a contract as determinative of
whether that contract restrains trade, the Court stated the need to define the
relevant market in product and geographic terms and to estimate the extent of
the percentage of the foreclosure of competition of the market resulting from
the contract. Id. at 325-30. No illegality would result unless the contract were
found to "work a substantial ... lessening of competition in the relevant com-
petitive market." Id. at 333. In determining the relevant market in which the
defendant operated, the Court considered the area to which the plaintiff, as
buyer, could reasonably turn for alternative sources of supply. Id. at 331-33.
The Court concluded that the relevant effective area of competition was the area
in which these producers operated and in which they were willing to compete for
the consumer potential. Id. Those within that area would be the competitors of
the defendant vis-A-vis the plaintiff. Id.
The approach of the Court in Tampa reflects reality. Wherever one ob-
serves some systematic pairing of buyers and sellers, that realm is, presump-
tively, a "market." The presumption can be overcome by examining the degree
of insularity, i.e., how much change in price or other factors will decouple those
buyers and sellers and cause them to pair with those outside the "market." Id.
See Mason, supra, at 68-69.
100. See e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.
1982), aff'g in part and rev 'g in part In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 510
F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F.
Supp. 608 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1051 (1984); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62053 (W.D. Ky. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.
1981).
In National Farmers, various dairy cooperatives brought reciprocal antitrust
actions arising out of the fierce power struggles in the Midwest milk industry
during the late 1960's and early 1970's. 687 F.2d at 1179. Reviewing the dis-
trict court's findings, the Eighth Circuit found that four cooperatives, Mid-
America Dairymen, Inc., Associated Milk Producers, Inc., Central Milk Produ-
cers Cooperative, and Associated Reserve Standby Pool Cooperative, had con-
spired to monopolize and to eliminate competition in the Grade A milk market
in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1191. In considering whether a
relevant product market had been established, the Eighth Circuit stated that
raw Grade A milk is a relevant product market.... [T]he findings show
that only Grade A milk may be used for fluid products for human con-
sumption; that Grade B milk, by definition, cannot be a substitute for or
be interchanged with Grade A milk for Class I uses; that demand for
Grade A fluid products is relatively inelastic; that production of Grade
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A milk requires stricter sanitary methods and necessitates conversion
costs and higher production costs than Grade B milk; that Grade A milk
is supported by minimum federally regulated prices, while Grade B
prices are established in the open market; and that "premium" prices
negotiated by cooperatives primarily relate to Grade A milk used for
Class I purposes. In any commercially meaningful sense, Grade A milk
is thus a relevant product market for antitrust purposes and has been
deemed such in other milk monopolization cases.
Id. at 1191-92 (citations omitted).
In Kinnett Dairies, plaintiff dairy processor brought a civil antitrust action
against defendant milk marketing association alleging, in part, violations of § 1
and § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 2 and § 3 of the Clayton Act as a result of
defendant's involvement with other marketing associations and its individual
conduct toward plaintiff and other dairy processors with regard to price fixing,
sale and distribution of milk within a Federal Milk Marketing Order. 512 F.
Supp. at 611-14. In its consideration of the relevant product market pertaining
to the charge of unlawful monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the
district court stated:
Producers in the industry are recognized as either Grade A or
Grade B. Grade A producers generally receive more for their milk than
Grade B producers. To be a Grade A producer, a farmer must meet...
standards... with respect to both production and storage. These stan-
dards are much more strict with respect to Grade A milk than Grade B.
In addition, production of Grade A milk requires a higher initial capital
investment than Grade B production .... Consequently, a producer
does not simultaneously produce Grade A milk and Grade B milk from
the same facilities.
Grade A milk is distinguishable not only in terms of who produces
it, but also in terms of who [sic] its customers are. A customer (proces-
sor) who processes milk into both fluid and manufactured form at one
location can, for sanitation reasons, receive only Grade A into its plant.
Also, only handlers receiving Grade A milk from producers are subject
to regulation under federal milk marketing orders.
Id. at 623-24. The district court thus concluded that "Grade A milk is generally
recognized in the industry as a distinct product and line of commerce for fluid
consumption .... " Id.
In Dairymen, Inc., the United States sought injunctive relief against certain
alleged monopolistic practices followed by defendant milk marketing association
over a period of three years. In determining the relevant product market, the
district court stated that:
while Grade A and non-Grade A milk both originate in raw milk, they
have unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices and
specialized vendors. However, this finding must be qualified by noting
that in many instances the customers for Grade A milk are often cus-
tomers for non-Grade A milk, and that in many instances the sellers of
Grade A milk can also be sellers of non-Grade A milk .... Also, ...
Grade A milk can be used for the same purposes as non-Grade A milk,
and the facilities in which non-Grade A milk is produced can be
changed without great cost to facilities for the production of Grade A
milk.
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,053, at 74,540. The court went on to note,
though, that as the demand for milk is divided into two primary markets-the
first for fluid milk products and the second for manufactured milk products-the
market for fluid milk is effectively segregated from that for manufacturing milk.
Id. Thus, the court concluded that Grade A milk constituted the relevant prod-
uct market to test defendant's alleged anti-competitive practices. Id.
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test formulated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States' 0' and found:
Production of Grade A milk requires specialized assets; proces-
sors of fluid milk are prohibited from processing Grade B milk in
the same plant; Grade A milk prices are regulated and only Grade
A milk may be used for fluid consumption. 0 2 Proponents of a
wider product market definition have argued that the relevant
market is all raw milk. This would include Grade A and Grade B.
This claim is based on the fact that some Grade A milk goes into
manufactured products in competition with Grade B milk. 10 3
While "all milk" may be a relevant product market with regard to
sales for cheese manufacturing, when the focus of inquiry is fluid
milk, this argument fails.' 0 4 The major focus of this paper is milk
101. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In Brown Shoe, the United States brought suit to
enjoin consummation of a merger of two corporations on the ground that its
effect might be to lessen competition substantially or to create a monopoly in
the production, distribution, and sale of shoes, in violation of § 7 of the Clayton
Act. Id. at 296. Discussing determination of the relevant product market, the
Court stated:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it. However, within this
broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves,
constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries of
such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indi-
cia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate eco-
nomic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to
price changes, and specialized vendors.
Id. at 325 (footnotes and citation omitted).
102. For a discussion of courts determinations that Grade A milk consti-
tutes a relevant product market because of its unique production facilities, dis-
tinct customers, distinct prices, and specialized vendors, see supra note 100.
103. See, e.g., Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608 (M.D.
Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984);
United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 62,053 (W.D. Ky.
1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981). In both these
cases, defendant argued that the relevant product market was all raw milk. Kin-
nett Dairies, 512 F. Supp. at 623; Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,053, at 74,540. For a further discussion of Kinnett Dairies and Dairymen, Inc.,
see supra note 100. The "all milk" argument is essentially an application of the
Robinsonian definition of markets, see supra note 99, since for some uses, Grade
A and Grade B milk are substitutes. Further, Grade A and Grade B prices tend
to move together, but this is due to the regulatory formulae which set the prices,
and not unfettered market forces.
104. In order to charge a high price to cheese manufacturers, a cooperative
would need a monopoly of both Grade A and Grade B milk. But, to charge a
high price to milk bottlers, one needs only to monopolize Grade A milk. One
could say that "all milk" is a "market" and "Grade A milk" is a "submarket,"
relevant when the inquiry focuses on fluid milk. The market/submarket distinc-
tion is of little economic significance (an economist would call both "markets"),
especially since market lines cannot be drawn with absolute precision. Since the
courts speak in terms of markets and submarkets, such legal fictions will be used
here as well. It could be said that the outer bounds of a market are the "market"
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for fluid uses, therefore, as analyzed here, the product market is
Grade A milk.
b. Geographic Market
In litigation involving alleged antitrust violations by dairy co-
operatives, the scope of the relevant geographic market has been
the subject of considerable controversy.10 5 At one end of the
spectrum are those who argue that the market is no wider than
the applicable Federal Order. 0 6 Each of the Orders is designed
around an individually competitive sphere for the sale of
processed fluid product. Practical limitations on purchasing milk
from far outside the Order, which are imposed by the Federal sys-
tem, lend some support to the argument that markets should be
deemed congruent with Federal Orders. 0 7 Indeed, in virtually
all economic studies in which milk prices are compared or corre-
lated with cooperative market share, the markets are identical to
the Orders. 08 At least two courts have held the relevant market
to be the Federal Order in which the cooperative was primarily
centered. 0 9
and inner bounds define "submarkets". What is important is that the conceptu-
alization of the market or submarket reflect the actualities of competition and
influence, and that it be relevant to the inquiry.
105. See, e.g.,Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 624
(M.D. Ga. 1981) (plaintiff contended that the relevant geographic market was
the FMO-7 area (Georgia) while defendant contended that the relevant geo-
graphic market encompassed portions of fourteen states), aff'd, 715 F,2d 520
(1 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); United States v. Dairymen,
Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,053, at 74,538 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (plaintiff
contended that relevant geographic market was limited to specified Federal Or-
ders - but excluded solely state regulated areas - in southeastern states in
which defendant produced milk; defendant contended that relevant geographic
market included state regulated areas of production in southeastern states as
well as Federal Order areas in these states and additional midwestern states in
which defendant's milk was marketed), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 660 F.2d 192
(6th Cir. 1981). For a further discussion of Kinnett Dairies and Dairymen, Inc., see
supra notes 100 & 103.
106. See Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 624
(M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051
(1984).
107. For a discussion of allocation provisions and compensatory payments
and their market-restricting effects, see supra notes 82-88 and accompanying
text.
108. See, e.g., 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 38 (Federal Orders examined
as markets in analysis of price enhancement by milk cooperatives); Babb, Bessler
& Pheasant, Analysis of Over-Order Payments in Federal Milk Marketing Orders, AGR.
ExP. STA. BULL. No. 11 (9179) (analyzing cooperative market shares and premi-
ums within Federal Orders); R. T. Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 84, at 270
(correllating premiums and market shares within Federal Orders); D. L. Baumer,
supra note 72, at 25 (consideration of regulation of Federal Orders as markets).
109. See, e.g., North Texas Producers Ass'n, v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348
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At the other end of the spectrum are the proponents of the
widest geographic market imaginable-for instance, all milk east
of the Rocky Mountains. 110 The technological feasibility of long-
distance milk shipment and the fact that some milk does move
across Orders are two points cited in support of this broad
definition.
In defining the geographic scope of a cooperative's market
for antitrust purposes, one must consider the area in which the
cooperative operates and the area to which purchasers can practi-
cably turn for alternative sources of supply."' Consideration of
geographically localized areas ("submarkets") is proper under the
Sherman Act's condemnation of monopoly of "any part" of trade
or commerce.' 12 In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,"13 the
F.2d 189, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1965) (court found market to be Dallas-Fort Worth
area), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977; Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Produ-
cers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 483 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (market was defined as St. Louis
area), aff'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
110. For examples of the argument that the relevant geographic market
should extend well beyond the Federal Order, see supra note 103 (discussion of
defendants' arguments in Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp.
608 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1051 (1984); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,053 (W.D. Ky. 1978)). As in the product market dispute, this argument seeks
to apply Robinsonian terms to define the geographic limits of the market. For a
discussion of the product market dispute, see supra notes 100 & 104 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Robinsonian analysis, see supra note 99.
111. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963)
(in determination of relevant geographic market, proper focus is on "the geo-
graphic structure of supplier-customer relations"); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331 (1961) (relevant geographic market is market
in which competitors effectively compete and to which purchaser can practicably
turn for supplies). In United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.
1981), the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court for failing to undertake this
analysis of the relevant geographic market and, on remand, directed that the
district court "determine the relevant geographic submarkets on the basis of
commercially significant areas in which [Dairymen, Inc.] operated and in which
[Dairymen, Inc.'s] customers could turn to other suppliers." Id. at 195. For a
further discussion of Dairymen, Inc., see supra notes 100, 103 & 105.
The identification of the relevant geographic market through the considera-
tion of the area in which a cooperative operates and to which purchasers can
turn for alternative sources of supply is essentially the Mason approach. See Ma-
son, supra note 99, at 68-69.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (penalizing any attempt to monopolize or any
combination or conspiracy to monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States"). This inquiry is relevant for Sherman Act as well as
for Clayton Act purposes. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572-73
(1966) (Court saw no reason to differentiate between "line" of commerce in
context of Clayton Act and "part" of commerce in context of Sherman Act);
International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 251 (1959) (ap-
plication of Sherman Act to trade or commerce in localized geographical area);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948) (" '[a]ny
part' is construed to mean an appreciable part of interstate or foreign trade or
1986]
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Supreme Court identified economic principles that must be kept
in mind when analyzing geographic markets. The question is not
where a purchaser actually bought supplies, 1 4 but rather, where
one should reasonably or practicably find a competitive alterna-
tive if the market were competitive."15 Therefore, the area in
which the buyer actually made purchases cannot be determinative
of the scope of the market when the gravamen of the complaint is
that the seller foreclosed all reasonable alternatives, forcing the
buyer, at great cost and inconvenience, to go far afield for its nec-
essary supply. "If one is to base empirical delineation of the ex-
tent of a market upon observations of which sellers are in fact
utilized by buyers, the key problem is to differentiate the factor of
necessity from that of convenience."' "1 6 The same logic can be
commerce"). But see Comment, Relevant Geographic Market Delineation: The Inter-
changeability of Standards in Cases Arising Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1152 (1979). The author of the comment
cited the subsequently reversed district court opinion in United States v. Dairymen,
Inc., as the sole legal authority for his position. Id. at 1166-68, 1183. The dis-
trict court in Kinnett Dairies cites, as its authority, the same district court opinion
in United States v. Dairymen, Inc. and the above-mentioned comment. Kinnett
Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 640 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715
F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
113. 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). The Tampa Court held that in a given case it
is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of
effective competition, taking into account economic factors. Id. For a discussion
of Tampa, see supra note 99.
114. See Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 639
(M.D. Ga. 1981) (relevant geographic market is that physical area in which sell-
ers of particular product can practicably turn for such products as indicated by
actual movements of milk) (emphasis added), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11 th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
115. F.M. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 60-61 (defining market in terms of
substitutability of one competitor's product for another); R.A. POSNER, supra
note 95, at 128; see also Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449,
456-57 (9th Cir. 1966) (seller's area of operation should be used only to narrow
market definition when seller does not serve all of a larger market, not to expand
it beyond what would otherwise be economically sensible), rev'd on other grounds,
389 U.S. 384 (1967); T. VON KALINOWSKI, 16B BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTI-
TRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 8.02(2)(b) (1985) (availability of buyers
important factor).
116. Steiner, Markets and Industries, 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 579 (1968) (emphasis added). Failure to distinguish between
factors of necessity and those of convenience when making empirical observa-
tions of market behavior can be fatal to the integrity of a market definition. The
result can be a severely overstated or understated market, causing an artificially
diluted or concentrated estimate of market power. In defining markets, one
must beware of products or areas that become substitutes by virtue of anticom-
petitive activity. "[A]t a high enough price even poor substitutes look good
.... R.A. POSNER, supra note 95, at 128. As Scherer reasons, in this regard the
courts have shown
conspicuous inattention to the key question of how much prices can be
elevated before drawing supplies from other points included at the
218
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used when the inquiry arises from claims that competitors have
been injured: what is the area to which competitors can reason-
ably turn to market their products? If a seller cannot practicably
turn to a broader area to find purchasers, the smaller area can be
called a "submarket" for those purposes. Proper definition of a
relevant market is generally viewed as a prerequisite to further
inquiry. The use for which the market definition is desired is one
factor in the definition itself: The market must be "relevant.""l 7
Thus, in some instances the market may be as small as an Or-
der ' 8 and in others, it may be a multistate area. The bottom line
is that the relevant market must be defined in a manner which
reflects reality. If a market is defined too broadly, the market
power of the firms within the market will be understated. If one
delineates too narrow a market, the result will be an inflation of
the market power of the market participants.
2. Cooperative Market Shares
The dairy industry, like other agricultural sectors, has grown
increasingly concentrated over the years. Producers have de-
clined in number 1 9 at the same time production has increased. 120
Technological advances have resulted in economies of scale and
specialization which have induced less efficient farmers to sell
their operations.
Cooperatives are now a vital force in the dairy industry. By
1974, nearly eighty-eight percent of the milk producers delivering
margin of the relevant market. In other words, how broadly a market is
defined is really a question of how much elevation of prices is to be
tolerated before inferring that unacceptable monopoly power exists.
F.M. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 549 n. 111 (emphasis in original).
117. See, e.g., supra note 104 (discussion of cheese manufacturers versus
milk bottlers).
118. Markets may in some cases be even smaller than the Order. For exam-
ple, within the Texas Order there are at least five different markets. Pricing
patterns are determined by and vary between these markets and "competitive
credits" are granted between these markets.
119. The decline in producer numbers is often used as a justification for
leniency in the application of the antitrust laws. See Comment, Agricultural Coop-
eratives: Gain of Market Power and the Antitrut Exemption, 27 S. DAK. L. REV. 476,
493 (1982) (since concentration in the food processing industry has also in-
creased, agriculture is nearly a "model of perfect competition").
120. In 1924 there were about 89 billion pounds of milk produced per an-
num. This increased to 102 billion in 1937 and 116 billion in 1949. ECONOMIC
RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEPT'T OF AGRICULTURE, DAIRY STATISTICS THROUGH 1960
at 303 (Statistical Bull. 1 1962). By 1982, milk was produced at an annual rate of
135 billion pounds. CROP REP. BD., STATISTICAL REP. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRI-
CULTURE, MILK PRODUCTION 4 (Feb. 15, 1983).
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to Federal Orders belonged to cooperatives.12 ' In December
1973, over ninety-nine percent of the milk delivered in twenty-
five of the sixty-one Federal Market Orders was delivered by co-
operative members. In forty-six markets, the percentage of pro-
cedures belonging to cooperatives exceeded ninety. 22 Literally
hundreds of cooperative mergers in the 1960's and 1970's yielded
several large regional cooperatives.123 Associated Milk Produ-
cers, Inc. (AMPI) has substantial market shares from the Wiscon-
sin-Chicago area south through Western Tennessee, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and most of Texas.124 Dairymen, Inc. (DI), formed in
1968 from eight separate cooperatives, now dominates all of the
Federal Order markets to the south and east of Kentucky with the
exception of those in Florida. Mid-America Dairymen (Mid-Am)
has large market shares in several of the markets in areas around
Kansas and Missouri. Through the use of what is known as the
Standby Pool, 1 25 these three major cooperatives and several
others were able to keep farmers in unregulated upper-midwest-
ern areas from shipping to any regulated market unless requested
to do so by the dominant cooperative in the market. Once the
operation of the Standby Pool was limited by consent decrees,1 26
the producers voted for Federal Order regulation which keeps
that milk from competing in other markets. Federations, ranging
121. Memorandum from R.W. March, Deputy Director, Dairy Division, Ag-
ricultural Marketing Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, to all Market Administra-
tors (August 19, 1975) (discussing cooperatives in Federal Milk Market Orders).
122. DAIRY Div., AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICUL-
TURE, PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCERS BELONGING TO COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCERS BELONGING TO DOMINANT COOPERATIVE, AND
WEIGHTED OVER-ORDER PAYMENTS ON CLASS I MILK, BY FEDERAL ORDER MAR-
KETS 1 (1975).
123. R. FONES, J. HALL, & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 169-70.
124. In 1971 AMPI controlled over 90%7 of the milk supply in 11 Federal
Order Markets. Id.
125. The Standby Pool is basically territorial allocation among horizontal
competitors. Producers in regulated markets paid unregulated producers in the
Upper-Midwest not to ship milk south unless requested. One purpose of the
Standby Pool was said to be to have a ready reserve of surplus milk available if
there were shortages in more southern markets. The dominant purpose, how-
ever, was to prevent processors in the southern markets from undermining high
cooperative prices through imports from the Upper-Midwest. But for the Cap-
per-Volstead Act, the Standby Pool would be a per se violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.
126. The legality of the Associated Reserve Standby Pool Cooperative was
not directly challenged in two antitrust cases brought by the Department ofJus-
tice. See United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D.
Mo. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United
States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,508
(W.D. Mo. 1977). However, the consent decrees entered in these cases placed
some limitations on the operation of the Standby Pool.
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from relatively loose agreements between cooperatives to align
prices, to tighter organizations known as "superpools," have
evolved as another means of amalgamating cooperative market
shares. 127
C. Cooperative Market Power
While market shares in many Orders are of the size often as-
sociated with monopoly, 128 concentration alone is not an auto-
matic indicator of monopoly power.' 29 Moreover, it has been
argued that certain fundamental differences between cooperatives
and corporations, i.e., the inability to control total supply and the
voluntary nature of membership, militate in favor of more gener-
ous standards by which the relationship between cooperative
market share and cooperative market power should be as-
sessed.' 30 These arguments are not totally meritless, but they ig-
127. The superpool agreement in the Chicago area set up a single agency
as the marketing agent for all of the primary cooperatives in the area. Although
the largest cooperative had only 40% of the market, the superpool represented
90-95% of the market. In United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394
F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
940 (1976), an antitrust action against the nation's largest milk cooperative, the
parties submitted a consent decree, the provisions of which did not challenge
the validity of the cooperative superpool arrangement. The consent decree was
subsequently approved by the district court. 394 F. Supp. at 44-46. Similarly, in
United States v. Dairymen, Inc., the challenge was not to the superpool arrange-
ment itself, but, rather to its use in a predatory fashion. 1978-1 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 62,053, at 74,546 (W.D. Ky. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 660
F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981). In Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., the legality of
the superpool arrangement was upheld as a justified marketing activity by an
agricultural association within the meaning of the Capper-Volstead exemption.
512 F. Supp. 608,633 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (1 lth Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). For a further discussion of Dairymen, Inc., and Kin-
nett Dairies, see supra notes 100, 103, 105 & 111.
128. Market shares as low as 55-60% have been held to be "monopoly
power or near monopoly power." Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Pro-
ducers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
Monopoly power will almost certainly be found where the market share exceeds
70%. See Warlich & Brill, Cooperatives Vis-a-Vis Corporations: Size, Antitrust and Im-
munity, 23 S. DAK. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1978) (discussing market share (relative
size) as key to all monopolization charges).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945) (60 to 64% market share is not necessarily monopoly power).
130. See, e.g., Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1040
(2d Cir. 1980) (noting fundamental differences between cooperative and corpo-
ration), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981); A.D. MANCHESTER, supra note 62, at 31,
37 (stating that basis of cooperative market power is different from corporations,
mandating different conclusions from equal market shares); McCormick, Modifi-
cation of the Agricultural Cooperative Exemption: Good or Bad?, 48 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 565, 575 (1979) (unique structural features of agriculture require different
treatment from that accorded other businesses); Comment, supra note 119, at
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nore important factors that ameliorate these superficial
differences.
A cooperative that wishes to charge a monopoly price faces a
challenge in that it must restrict supply at the same time that its
individual members will want to increase their production to take
advantage of the higher selling price. 31 Dairy cooperatives are
helped in this regard by classified pricing and the relative inelas-
ticity of the total supply of milk. The monopoly price is typically
exacted as a premium above the federally mandated Class I
price. 132 Since demand for Class I milk is essentially inelastic, an
increase in price will have a negligible effect on sales.' 3 3 In terms
of controlling supply to maintain the monopoly price, all that is
necessary is to control the supply of Class I milk because any ex-
cess production goes into Class II for which demand is almost
infinitely elastic. Even with increased Class II sales, a Class I pre-
mium yields a net benefit to cooperative members since the blend
price received by them will, on average, be increased by the pre-
mium times the proportion of Class I sales.' 3 4 Moreover, since
the supply of milk is inelastic, 135 short run supply will remain sta-
493 (noting reliance by cooperatives on support of their membership and result-
ing inability of cooperatives to control supply of commodities).
131. For a discussion of the basis of the 1920's sentiment that a producer
monopoly would be impossible to maintain, see supra note 31.
132. Premiums, or "over-order payments," sometimes represent payment
for services the cooperative provides to the processor in addition to an increase
in selling price. At least to the extent that the premium exceeds the value (to the
buyer) of services provided by the cooperative, it is only by virtue of its market
power that a cooperative can force a buyer to pay such an inflated price. A.C.
Manchester observes that premiums, or "over-order payments" coincided with
the above-described growth of huge regional cooperatives and federations. He
goes on to note that premiums are a "handy indicator," used by some analysts as
a measure of undue price enhancement. A.C. MANCHESTER, supra note 62, at 48.
133. See W. NICHOLLS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION WITHIN AGRICULTURAL IN-
DUSTRIES 184 (1947) (Class I demand is normally inelastic).
134. The basic blend price received by each farmer is determined by utiliza-
tion of milk in the entire Order and is distributed across the entire Order as a
single per hundred weight (cwt.) price for all milk. But, if a seller charges a
premium, the seller keeps the premium; if the seller is a cooperative, the pre-
mium is distributed to the members in addition to the blend price. Thus, if a
cooperative charges a $1.00 per cwt. premium on Class I milk and has 50%
Class I sales, the members receive blend price plus $.50 per cwt. Since price
supports and low product shipping costs make the demand for Class II milk
highly elastic, especially on a local Order basis, large premiums on Class II milk
are relatively infrequent.
135. Halverson, The Response of Milk Production to Price, 40 J. FARM. ECON.
1101 (1958) (discussing inelasticity of milk supply and production response to
price); Whipple, An Analysis of Reconstituted Milk Pricing Policy, 65 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 207 (1983) (considering impact on milk supply of alteration in pricing
provisions); Wilson & Thompson, Demand, Supply, and Price Relationships for the
Dairy Sector, Post-World War II Period, 49 J. FARM. ECON. 360 (1967) (proposing
222
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/3
CURDLING THE COMPETITION
ble and the cooperative will have little long run competition from
new entrants.
Even with stable supply, a cooperative charging a premium
still faces the theoretical threat of competition from members
who could splinter and form a rival cooperative. By undercutting
the premium, the defectors could sell all of their milk as Class I
and pocket all of the premium. 136 Eventually, competition be-
tween former members and the original cooperative would drive
the price back to the Federal Order level. But, practical limita-
tions and overt acts by cooperatives have enabled the large coop-
eratives to maintain control over membership despite the
attractiveness of defection and competition.
Despite technological advances, milk is still highly perishable.
This and the fact that cows must be milked daily means that milk
for fluid consumption cannot be stockpiled. This makes the farm-
ers and the buyers unusually vulnerable since neither can afford
to wait for a better price at a later date. Cooperatives with
supervailing power have exploited this vulnerability by creating
disincentives intended to discourage purchases from competing
cooperatives or individual producers. Handlers have been
charged variable prices, depending on the proportion of milk they
purchased from competitors or whether they changed their rate
of purchase over the annual production cycle.' 37 Buyers have
been presented with "all or nothing" contracts, which required
them to purchase their full supply from the cooperative or noth-
ing at all. 13 8 A related measure has been to lock buyers into
"committed supply contracts" whereby a certain proportion of
each buyer's needs must be met by the cooperative.' 3 9 Coopera-
model allowing for simultaneity of supply and demand estimates and concluding
that supply of milk is inelastic with respect to its average price).
136. If a cooperative with 50% Class I sales charged a $1.00 per cwt. pre-
mium, members would receive blend price plus $.50 per cwt. for all milk sold
(assuming the entire premium was passed on to members). A splinter group
could charge a $.90 Class I premium and, if it achieved 100% Class I sales, pay
its members blend price plus $.90 per cwt.-a $.40 gain.
137. See, e.g., Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 619
(M.D. Ga. 1981) (in several instances cooperative retaliated against handlers'
purchases from rival sources by shutting off supply on short notice), aff'd, 715
F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
138. See e.g., United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,053 at 74,541 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (attempt by defendant cooperative to force
processors to execute full supply contracts in order to eliminate competition and
control prices), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981).
139. See, e.g., Alexander v National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1198 (8th
Cir. 1982) (cooperative secured substantial committed supply agreement from
purchaser after threatening supply cutoff).
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tives have vigorously enforced contractual limitations in the activ-
ities of members and buyers,140  thus circumscribing the
opportunities for farmers to form competing cooperatives. Fi-
nally, where former members or independent producers have
tried to compete, dominant cooperatives have responded with
predatory pricing in order to keep customers from switching to
the competition. Cooperative members will be less likely to splin-
ter and try to compete if they know they will be met by
predation.1 4 1
In addition, economies of scale prevent individual farmers
from splintering and competing alone. Unless a sufficient
number of producers located within practicable pickup distances
were to resign from the cooperative at the same time, increased
fixed operating costs would absorb the difference between the
blend price and prorated premium. 42 If, as often happens, the
expiration dates of the membership agreements vary, 143 the logis-
tics of forming splinter groups will be even more cumbersome.
Thus, neither alleged lack of control over (total) supply nor
alleged lack of control over membership necessarily serve to pro-
vide a meaningful distinction between cooperatives and corpora-
tions for the purpose of analyzing the relationship between
market share and market power.
140. Id.
141. R. FONES, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 337.
142. Few individual dairy farms produce enough to fill a full sized milk
tanker truck. Since the cost is about the same whether the truck is full or not,
the per cwt. cost of transport rises as the quantity transported decreases. In
addition, to the extent that over-Order premiums represent payment for serv-
ices to buyers provided by the cooperative, the splinter group will either have to
keep the price high enough to cover those costs, or not provide the service and
charge a lower premium. For instance, in 1975, Dairymen, Inc., charge an aver-
age premium of $1.00. Of this, the cooperative maintained that $.28 per cwt.
covered "such services as field and laboratory services, disposing of daily and
seasonal surpluses, hauling costs that are not recovered from producers, payrol-
ling, and a number of servcies incidental to supplying handlers under a full sup-
ply contract." 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 46. Some fraction of these
services was of value to buyers, so a splinter group would have to supply them or
offer a yet better price. Services to members reflect how much splinter group
producers must earn to find splintering an attractive alternative. Of course, a
fringe competitor (or any cooperative in a competitive market) cannot pass on
such costs in the form of higher premiums.
143. See United States v. American Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 20,
47 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (setting forth provisions in AMPI consent decree designed
to address this and similar problems), aff'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 940 (1976).
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D. Market Power and Cooperative Conduct
An examination of the behavior of dominant cooperatives
confirms a positive correlation between high market share and
monopoly power. From a perusal of the reported antitrust cases,
a smorgasbord of predatory or competition-stifling activity un-
folds. In order to increase or maintain market dominance, coop-
eratives have used boycotts, compelled customers to deal with
them on an exclusive basis, interfered with the shipment of non-
members' milk, imposed tying provisions, and conspired with
non-producers to fix artificially high prices. 14 4 Courts have not
hestitated to find cooperatives liable for monopolization or at-
tempts to monopolize in the face of such activity. 145 Regardless
of the legality of predatory or anticompetitive acts, such endeav-
ors would not be undertaken without the expectation of gain, 14 6
nor would the cooperative be able to engage in such acts without
substantial market power.
The presence of price discrimination 14 7 is a manifestation of
144. For an exhaustive compendium of predatory cooperative practices, see
Hufstedler, supra note 29, at 462. For more recent cases involving predation by
cooperatives, see United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,053 (W.D. Ky. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.
1981); Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1191 (8th Cir.
1982). See also R. FONES, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 30-44; Eisen-
stat, Masson & Roddy, supra note 4, at 529-92.
145. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
469 (1960) (dairy cooperative's acquisition of competing processor tended to
create monopoly or substantially lessen competition); Otto Milk Co. v. United
Dairy Farmers Cooperative Ass'n, 388 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1967) (defendant coop-
erative association engaged in unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade and en-
deavored to monopolize marketing of milk in southwestern Pennsylvania);
North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
1965) (association engaged in monopolistic practices), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977
(1966); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476
(E.D. Mo. 1965) (dairy producers cooperative engaged in conspiracy to fix retail
prices of milk with intent to monopolize), aft'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
But see Kinnett Dairies v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 624 (M.D. Ga. 1981),
aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). The Kin-
nett court used a Robinsonian market definition and found that the cooperative
never possessed market power and, in light of that, held that such activities as
refusals to deal, imposition of full or committed supply contracts, cutting off
plaintiff's hauling operation, and cutting off customers who tried to buy from
competitors were not predatory. Id. at 633-38. For a discussion of Robinsonian
analysis, see supra note 99.
146. Gains would be made in terms of increased profits, increased market
shares, or protection of already high shares from erosion by competitors. In
many cases, such gains could only be accomplished by charging super-competi-
tive (monopoly) prices and/or by eliminating competitors.
147. See R.C. LIPSEY & P.O. STEINER, supra note 7, at 244. Price discrimina-
tion is the sale of the same item to different consumers at a different price for
reasons not associated with cost. Id.
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the monopoly power wielded by cooperatives. 48 In the milk in-
dustry, discriminatory pricing takes the form of premiums over
Federal Order Class I prices. 149 In the early 1960's, approxi-
mately one-third of the Federal Order markets had over-order
premiums. The frequency increased to seventy-eight percent of
the markets in June 1970 and reached ninety-six percent of the
markets in June 1976.150 In a competitive market, if producers
could receive higher payments over the blend price from some
buyers than from others, they would compete for these higher
price outlets by offering price advantages. Eventually, through
competition, prices would reach equilibrium and there would no
longer be price discrimination. The fact that cooperatives are
able to effect sustained discriminatory pricing indicates that they
have achieved supervailing power. Simple countervailing power
would result in all buyers within the same market paying the same
price.
Moreover, the existence of price discrimination undermines
the argument that over-Order premiums represent payment for
services provided by the cooperative that would otherwise have to
be performed at the handler's expense. Only a cooperative with
supervailing power could force a handler with ninety percent
Class I utilization to pay ninety cents over the Order price while a
competing handler with seventy-five percent Class I utilization
148. Price discrimination is a symptom of market power generally. Id. at
243-44. Persistent price discrimination is of particular importance for antitrust
analysis because it requires for its success, the exercise of monopoly power. Id.
R.A. Posner noted that "persistent [price] discrimination is very good evidence
of monopoly." R.A. POSNER, supra note 95, at 62-65. Indeed. E.G. Nourse iden-
tified price discrimination by cooperatives as one of the difficult issues to be
confronted in the future if cooperative power evolves beyond counteraviling to
supervailing power. E.G. NOURSE, supra note 16, at 436-39.
149. The classified pricing scheme automatically injects a degree of price
discrimination into the market, since it requires handlers to pay varying prices
based on their utilization of an undifferentiated product. Producers, on the
other hand, receive a uniform price, the blend price, throughout the Order
based on Order-wide utilization-plus whatever premium the individual cooper-
ative is able to charge. Discussion of discriminatory pricing, therefore, will be in
terms of the prices charged above the Federal minimums, and their influence on
the prices received by member-producers. The following example illustrates the
way in which premiums are a form of price discrimination. If a cooperative is
able to charge a $1.00 per cwt. premium on Class I milk, and delivers the same
services to all of its customers, members nonetheless receive blend price plus
$.75 per cwt. from a handler with 75% Class I utilization but receive blend price
plus $.90 per cwt. from a handler with 90% Class I utilization.
150. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 13-14. Premiums have constituted five
to ten percent of the raw milk price, a substantial markup for an homogeneous
intermediate good. Id. at 13. The effect at retail may have been as high as five to
ten cents per gallon.
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pays only seventy-five cents above the Order price for the same
milk and the same package of services. Furthermore, since the
premiums are not payments for services that otherwise must be
performed by handlers, the cost of discriminatory pricing is often
passed directly to the consumer. 151 Countervailing seller power
yields a decrease in consumer prices while supervailing power,
through discriminatorily high Class I premiums, increases con-
sumer prices.
Statistical studies examining the relationship between coop-
erative market share and premiums lend further support to the
conclusion that market shares in excess of sixty to seventy-five
percent give rise to substantial market power. Robert T. Masson,
using information supplied by the USDA regarding dominant co-
operative share and Class I premiums, tested whether the exist-
ence of premiums in excess of ten cents per hundredweight was
positively correlated with cooperative market shares. 52 It was
concluded, with an error rate of less than 0.001, that cooperatives
with market shares greater than seventy percent are significantly
more likely than cooperatives with lower market shares to have
substantial Class I premiums. 53 David L. Baumer had access to
more detailed information from the USDA, permitting examina-
tion of such factors as entry barriers and transportation costs. 54
Relating dominant cooperative market share to Class I premiums,
he found a strong statistical relationship for the year 1974 and the
year mid-1974 to mid-1975. After accounting for other factors
such as transportation costs, most cooperatives with market
shares above the sixty to seventy percent level appeared to have
substantial premiums. Moreover, he found that higher coopera-
tive market share was related to significantly higher retail milk
prices. 15 5
151. D.L. Baumer, supra note 72, at 99. For an analysis of the societal costs,
see Ippolito & Masson, supra note 77.
152. R.T. Masson, The Relationship Between Federal Order Market Shares
and Class I Premiums (1976) (on file at United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Economic Policy Office) (demonstrating correlations between
high market shares and substantial premiums).
153. Id.
154. D.L. Baumer, supra note 72, at 112. If no barriers existed to the free
sale of milk, there would be no correlation between cooperative concentration
and effective Class I prices or over-Order payments. On the other hand, if there
were barriers, there would be a positive correlation between the two. For a fur-
ther discussion of this examination and results, see infra note 155 and accompa-
nying text.
155. In 1974 and 1975, where the dominant cooperative had a market share
in excess of 60%, retail milk prices were three to five cents higher. D.L. Baumer,
supra note 72, at 133.
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The studies by the USDA 156 and Emerson Babb et al.,' 57
seem at first blush, to refute the correlation between market share
and premiums, but closer examination reveals no significant con-
tradiction. The USDA study suffers from three material defects:
(1) it set too high a statistical burden of proof for administrative
policy making or civil litigation; (2) it used an inappropriate statis-
tical test for the correlation of market shares and premiums; (3) it
failed to take into account the effect of antitrust consent decrees
on the activities of two major cooperatives. The USDA study, us-
ing the same data as Baumer, found that high market share coop-
eratives had higher premiums, but ruled the finding to be
insignificant, because there was a greater than one-out-of-twenty
chance for error. 58 But that standard, while perhaps the appro-
priate threshold for scientific research, exceeds the level neces-
sary for administrative economic policy. Given the test used, the
study's equations reveal a nine-out-of-ten chance of relationship
which is well above what could be termed the "preponderance of
the evidence."
The statistical test used by the USDA was a "two tailed test,"
designed to answer the question, "Did high market share cooper-
atives have considerably different-higher or lower-prices from
low market share cooperatives?" However, low market share co-
operatives almost never charge any premium, so high market
share cooperatives will not show lower prices and nothing will ap-
pear on the low end tail of the test. The effect of anything ap-
pearing on the high end tail is thus diminished by one half.' 59
The proper test would simply focus on whether high market share
cooperatives have higher prices than low market share coopera-
tives. Based on the data reported in the study, the question
would be answered in the affirmative, with a less than one-out-of-
twenty chance for error.1 60
Another factor which tends to bias the USDA findings is the
156. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63.
157. Babb, Bessler & Pheasant, supra note 108.
158. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 68.
159. Thus, when a two-tail test is inappropriately used, the correlation be-
tween the cooperative market share and price will have to be higher in order to
be recorded as statistically significant. A finding of statistical significance at the
.05 level (a market power coefficient high enough that such a value would only
appear by chance less than one in twenty times if the actual relationship between
price and cooperative market share were zero) actually means that market share
is statistically significant at the .025 level, which is a very high level of statistical
significance.
160. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at Appendix II. The data also show
higher premiums where market share exceeds 40%. Id. at 68, 70.
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consent decrees in United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. ,161
and United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. ,162 which had a sig-
nificant effect on milk prices from mid-1975 on. The data for the
pre-consent decree time periods show a significant relationship
between market share and premium. 63 The conclusion that the
market share/premium relationship is unstable over time 164 fails
to note that what has been identified is pre- and post-consent de-
cree time periods. Lastly, the study points to the fact that AMPI,
a major cooperative, showed a statistically significant negative re-
lationship. 65 Yet, the lower premiums cited occurred during the
year following the consent decree.
Thus, with the appropriate standard of proof, the appropri-
ate statistical tests, and due regard for the effect of the antitrust
cases, the USDA study confirms, rather than refutes, a correlation
between high market share and premiums.
The study by Babb, Bessler, and Pheasant found a positive
161. 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aft'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). The consent decree, by eliminating AMPI's ability
to coerce non-members to join the cooperative, attempted to allow both non-
members and former members of AMPI to compete with the cooperative associ-
ation. 394 F. Supp. at 52. The consent decree enjoined AMPI, in part, from:
Using threats, coercion, or undue influence to induce any producer to
join or refrain from teminating its membership in defendant or to de-
liver its milk to defendant; entering into any membership or marketing
agreement with any member-producer which binds such member-pro-
ducer to deliver milk to defendant for a term in excess of one (1) year,
except any such contract may provide for automatic renewal for suc-
ceeding periods of one (1) year, if either party does not give notice of
termination at least thirty (30) days prior to the termination date of
such contract and provided that defendant will promptly provide any
member-producer, who so requests, with written notice of the termina-
tion date of his contract and the dates on which he can effectively give
notice of termination of said contract; compelling or attempting to
compel any member-producer to enter into any contract, agreement or
understanding which restricts the right of said member-producer to sell
any milk to any processor after said member-producer has lawfully ter-
minated his membership and marketing agreement or contract with
defendant....
Id. at 52-53.
162. 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,509 (W.D. Mo. 1977). The consent
decree enjoined the cooperative from entering into any exclusive hauling agree-
ments. Id. at 71,983. Any sales agreement that contained certain agreements as
to times, supplies, and price was prohibited. Id. at 71,982-983. Lastly, the coop-
erative had to divest itself of certain assets, and was prevented from acquiring
lants for a period of five years without informing the Government. Id. at1,983-984.
163. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 66 ("Over-Order Payments for 1974
and 1974-1975").
164. Id. at 74.
165. Id. at 74-75.
1986] 229
47
Baumer et al.: Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the A
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
correlation between market share and premiums for the years
1965 through 1972, with a less than one-out-of-twenty chance for
error. For the years 1973 through 1977, the study shows that the
positive relationship continues to exist, but with a greater than
one-out-of-twenty chance of error. 166 The discrepancy for 1973
can be explained by the effect of Federal Phase III price controls
in 1973 which caught and held AMPI's prices at low levels.' 67
From mid-1975 on, the pricing structure throughout the AMPI
region was significantly lowered and the effect of the Standby
Pool was dissipated by the signing of the consent decree in Associ-
ated Milk Producers, Inc.. 168 Shortly thereafter, the consent decree
in Mid-America Dairymen was signed, 169 with similar procompetitive
effect. 170 Several high market share markets would hence have
lower premiums due to antitrust enforcement policy, not because
cooperatives lacked monopoly power. Thus, if the time periods
affected by price controls and consent decrees are omitted,
Babb's study shows a positive relationship between market share
and premiums, with a less than one-out-of-twenty chance of
error. 171
The behavioral and empirical evidence compels a conclusion
that cooperatives with market shares in excess of sixty to seventy-
five percent possess-and use-monopoly power. Contemporary
dairy cooperatives have, in many markets, exceeded counter-
vailing power and now possess and exercise supervailing power.
The differences between dairy cooperatives and corporations in
this regard are thus not very real. Therefore, no justification ex-
ists for judging the relationship between cooperative market
166. BABB, BESSLER & PHEASANT, supra note 108, at Appendix B.
167. The AMPI region covered almost 25% of the markets studied by
Babb, Bessler, and Pheasant. Id. at 96.
168. For a discussion of the Associated Milk Producers result, see supra notes
125-26 & 161.
169. For a discussion of the Mid-America Dairymen result, see supra note 162.
170. See R.T. Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 84 (showing that consent de-
crees themselves had pro-competitive significance).
171. The results for 1974 remain weaker than one chance out of twenty,
but how much weaker is not reported. All three alternative studies did find 1974
significant at this level. Babb, Bessler, and Pheasant also used a pooled test to
see whether there is a stable relationship across time between the cooperative
market share within each Order and the premiums in that Order. They conclude
that, since the results of the pooled test did not have results supportive of the
market share/premium relationship with a statistical chance of error of less than
one-out-of-twenty, no market share/premium relationship exists-despite the
individual year results. BABB, BESSLER & PHEASANT, supra note 108, at 103. This
is methodologically incorrect. USDA will not provide the data Babb used to
other researchers to use in appropriately specified statistical tests.
230 [Vol. 3 1: p. 183
48
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/3
CURDLING THE COMPETITION
share and cooperative market power by a standard different from
that employed for corporations.172
III. THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND SUPERVAILING
COOPERATIVE POWER
The antitrust laws, if properly applied, can provide an effec-
tive antidote to supervailing cooperative power. However, in
spite of the Supreme Court's clear statements that the Clayton
section 6/Capper-Volstead exemption is limited in scope, courts
and prosecutors have allowed many abuses to persist un-
abated. 173 This may be due to the fact that no one has simultane-
ously analyzed the legal and economic roots of the exemption and
carried both analyses to their logical conclusions. The last sec-
tion of this paper melds these two modes of analysis and suggests
a cohesive standard by which to examine cooperatives which will
serve the goals of the Capper-Volstead Act. Congress intended
only to give farmers countervailing power and to provide them
with "the same unified competitive advantage-and responsibility"
as corporations. 174 As a threshold matter it must be remembered
that without an exemption, the mere formation of a cooperative
association designed to raise prices by joint action is a restraint of
trade. 75 As noted previously, the sole purpose of creating a lim-
ited exemption was to permit farmers to act together and to carry
out the "legitimate objects" of cooperative association. 76
Among such legitimate objects and activities are marketing mem-
bers' products, bargaining on behalf of members or member as-
sociations, processing members' products, fixing the prices at
which members' products will be sold, and even representing
172. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), Judge Learned Hand, in considering Alcoa's 90% market share, stated,
"That percentage is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether
sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is
not." Id. at 424. Subsequent courts have attempted to establish a more precise
standard by which to measure monopolization: 70% or greater market share
would be enough to find monopoly power; 50% or less seems to be less than is
required and between 50% and 60% might be enough to find a dangerous
probability of monopolization in an attempt-to-monopolize case. See Warlich &
Brill, supra note 128, at 566-67 (collecting cases and discussing requisite market
share necessary for finding of monopoly power).
173. For a discussion of cases construing the agricultural exemption
broadly, see infra notes 200-205.
174. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
466 (1960) (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 465.
176. Id.
1986]
49
Baumer et al.: Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the A
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
100% of the producers. 177 However, cooperatives are not "free
to engage in practices against other persons in order to monopo-
lize trade or to restrain and suppress competition with the coop-
erative."' 78 Nor may a cooperative use its dominant position in
the market place, even if lawfully obtained, "as a lever further to
suppress competition."'' 79 Thus, there are also legal constraints
on the manner in which cooperatives may achieve their legitimate
objects. Furthermore, anticompetitive mergers should be distin-
guished from Capper-Volstead's authorization of "marketing
agencies in common"' 180 and should be enjoined. Finally, built
into the Capper-Volstead scheme is the untapped potential for
substantial corrective measures if any cooperative activities result
in unduly enhanced prices.' 8 ' Monopolization, anticompetitive
mergers, and restraints of trade that unduly enhance prices can
and should be addressed under antitrust law when the agricul-
tural exemption is limited to its intended proportions.
A. Monopolization
An agricultural cooperative, either singly or in combination
with other cooperatives, may willfully attain 100% of a market, as
long as it is achieved by the voluntary association of its members
and through voluntary agreements. 8 2 However, cooperatives are
liable under section 2 of the Sherman Act if they attain or exercise
177. See Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.,
497 F.2d 203, 214-16 (9th Cir.) (legitimate objects include handling and market-
ing), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974); Hufstedler, supra note 29, at 459 (discuss-
ing judicial interpretation of "legitimate objects" of cooperation).
178. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
467 (1960). See also Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 211 (9th Cir.) (citing Maryland & Virginia Milk in support of
the idea that cooperatives are not per se illegal, but become unlawful when en-
gaging in anticompetitive activities), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974).
179. See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S.
458, 472 (1960). See also Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 211-13 (9th Cir.) (discussing legitimate goals of coop-
eratives, and if they strive only to achieve legitimate goals, validity of such coop-
eratives), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974).
180. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
181. One commentator has called § 2"potentially... the most potent pro-
vision of any antitrust law" since it enables a regulatory agency to deal directly
with a firm's performance in the market place rather than merely the structure of
the industry. W.F. MUELLER, THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD EXEMPTION 14 (N.C. Pro-
ject 117, Working Paper Series, WP-27 1979). For a discussion of the Secretary
of Agriculture's regulatory authority under § 2, see supra notes 31-38 and ac-
companying text.
182. Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Act does not restrict cooperative size), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818
(1981). However, the Secretary of Agriculture may order a cooperative to cease
232 [Vol. 31: p. 183
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a monopoly position through "predatory practices,"183 "competi-
tion-stifling practices,"' 84 or "anticompetitive activities." 1 85 Such
behavior is "so far outside the 'legitimate objects' of a coopera-
tive that ... they would constitute clear violations of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act."' 186 Cooperatives and corporations are subject
to the same test for illegal monopolization. Recently, however,
some federal circuit courts of appeal have created a separate stan-
dard for cooperative monopolization: absent proof of predatory
conduct in achieving monopoly power, there will be no liability.
This differs from treatment of corporations which are liable for
suppressing competition whether they are attempting to achieve
monopoly power or attempting to stifle competition through the
monopoly power they have already achieved. As will be shown
below, there is no basis for such disparate treatment.
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adhere to the principle
that the Capper-Volstead Act was intended to allow cooperatives
to act like business corporations but "did not leave cooperatives
free to engage in practices against other persons in order to mo-
nopolize trade, or restrain and suppress competition with the co-
operative."1 87 These circuits have held cooperatives to the same
monopolization standards as corporations. The Sixth Circuit rec-
ognized that a cooperative may lawfully achieve a monopoly posi-
tion as long as it does so through voluntary membership or
voluntary agreements with other cooperatives, but held that it will
be liable under section 2 of the Sherman Act where it engages in
predation or where it undertakes anticompetitive practices with
the intent to stifle competition even if those practices also have a
and desist from monopolization if prices are unduly enhanced, regardless of the
means by which the monopoly was obtained). 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982).
183. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
467 (1960). See Treasure Valley Potato Bargainning Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 216 (9th Cir.) (cooperative loses its exemption if it engages
in predatory practices), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v.
Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 637 (W.D. Ga. 1981) (citing prior predatory
practices cases), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051
(1984); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476,
484 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (predatory acts used to gain control of market are illegal),
aff'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
184. See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States 362 U.S.
458, 463 (1960) (no intent by Congress to immunize cooperatives engaged in
competition-stifling practices from prosecution).
185. Id. at 468.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 467. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981); Trea-
sure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974).
51
Baumer et al.: Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the A
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
legitimate business justification.18 8 The Eighth Circuit has enun-
ciated a similar standard, holding that a cooperative may obtain a
monopoly position "so long as it is achieved through natural
growth, voluntary confederation, and without resort to predatory
or anticompetitive practices."'' 1 9 In addition, a court may sustain
a Sherman section 2 charge when a cooperative uses anticompeti-
tive activities that may have some business justification, but where
these practices are used with the intent to "stifle or smother com-
petition."1 90 Moreover, the court should look at the coopera-
tive's conduct as a whole to discern whether it is exclusionary.' 9'
The Ninth Circuit has held that there exists no basis for disparate
treatment of cooperative and corporate monopolization and has
specifically approved the application of the standard announced
in United States v. Grinnell Corp. 192 to the cooperative realm.193
188. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Sixth Circuit held in Dairymen, Inc. that the district court erred in requiring a
showing of predatory conduct. According to the Sixth Circuit, the key is
whether the defendant used its full supply contracts, committed supply con-
tracts, and exclusive hauling contracts with intent to stifle competition. If com-
petition-stifling intent is present, a practice that has economic justification will
be found illegal. Id.
189. Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1182 (8th Cir.
1982) (if there is anti-competitive activity that has economic justification, that is
done lawfully but is done with unlawful intent to stifle competition, it is illegal).
190. Id. at 1183 (quoting Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458, 463 (1960); citing United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660
F.2d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1981)). It is the means by which monopoly power is
acquired that is important. Thus, a particular merger of two cooperatives, while
it may be immune from Clayton § 7 liability, may form part of a competition-
stifling pattern of activity or an important means of attaining market power, in
violation of Sherman § 2. Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173,
1182 (8th Cir. 1982). Cf Warlich & Brill, supra note 128, at 566 (cooperatives
may not extend market power in ways not intended by Congress).
191. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
472 (1960); Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1206-07 (8th
Cir. 1982). The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Dairymen, Inc. directed the district
court, on remand, to "determine whether there were less exclusionary methods
in which [Dairymen, Inc.] could achieve its legitimate goals." 660 F.2d 192, 195
(6th Cir. 1981).
192. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The Grinnel standard states that:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two ele-
ments: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.
Id. at 570-71.
193. See Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Treasure Valley
Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974). At least one commentator specifically approves
of the application of Grinnell to cooperatives. See Note, The Agricultural Cooperative
[Vol. 31: p. 183
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A more recent decision has expressed the Grinnell rule in
terms equally well suited to cooperatives:
Even if that power has been legitimately acquired, the
monopolist may not wield it to prevent or impede
competition.
The mere possession of monopoly power does not ipso
facto condemn a market participant. But, to avoid the
proscriptions of § 2, the firm must refrain at all times
from conduct directed at smothering competition. This
doctrine has two branches. Unlawfully acquired power
remains anathema even when kept dormant. And it is no
less true that a firm with a legitimately achieved monop-
oly may not wield the resulting power to tighten its hold
on the market. 194
The Ninth Circuit takes a similar view of the Grinnell rule and
holds that even if a firm has legally acquired monopoly power, it
may not engage in practices that "unnecessarily exclude competi-
tion" from the marketplace. "It is no answer to the charge to say
that these practices are not 'predatory' but 'honestly industrial'-
that is, of a kind an ordinary enterprise might utilize with impu-
nity."' 195 The Sixth Circuit has found monopolization where a
monopolist's conduct "had the effect of deterring entry and re-
stricting the ability of competitors to expand."' 96
Antitrust Exemption-Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 396, 413-14 (1982) (Grinnell test would not burden cooperatives).
194. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d
Cir. 1979) (plaintiff alleged that monopolistic practices of defendant caused it to
lose sales in camera and photo finishing markets and to pay excessive prices for
supplies), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
195. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488, 498 (9th Cir.
1977) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). Discussing the ex-
ercise of these practices by IBM in light of its monopoly power, the Ninth Circuit
continued:
If the jury concluded IBM possessed monopoly power in the leasing of
general purpose computers, IBM would be precluded from employing
otherwise lawful practices that unnecessarily excluded competition
from the submarket. The question is whether the jury could have
found that the alleged practices were in fact adopted, and, if so,
whether they had the prohibited effect.
Id. at 498 (footnote omitted). Accord, California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM,
613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff need show only that monopolist's
acts "unnecessarily excluded competition" from relevant market, not that mo-
nopolist possessed specific intent to eliminate competitor).
196. Borden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 674 F.2d 498, 514, (6th Cir.
1982), vacated, 461 U.S. 940 (1983). In Borden, the finding of monopolization
was based on defendant's maintenance of a premium price for its reconstituted
1986] 235
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Courts have not hesitated to strike down cooperative monop-
olization upon proof of predatory practices. 97 However, some
courts and commentators have ignored the teachings of Maryland
& Virginia Milk Producers Association v. United States'9" and have
moved toward requiring proof of predation as the sine qua non of
illegal monopolization.' 99 The Second Circuit, in Fairdale Farms,
lemon juice, extensive advertising to increase product differentiation, selective
promotional allowances, and use of price reductions in areas of little competi-
tion to subsidize price reductions in areas of intense competition, while possess-
ing a market share in excess of 75%. 674 F.2d at 510-15.
197. See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S.
458, 469 (1960) (acquisition of dairy by cooperative association for purpose of
eliminating largest purchaser of non-association member milk, eliminating asso-
ciation's prime competitor in Government milk contract bidding, forcing produ-
cers to deal exclusively with association, and increasing association's control of
market violated Sherman and Clayton Acts); Otto Milk v. United Dairy Farmers
Cooperative Ass'n, 388 F.2d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 1967) (cooperative's activities in
inducing retailers to stop handling plaintiff's products constituted restraint of
trade in violation of Sherman Act); North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger
Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189, 196 (5th Cir. 1965) (cooperative unlawfully engaged
in tactics including boycotts of retailers handling plaintiff's milk to compel plain-
tiff to deal exclusively with it, thereby increasing its share of the market), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers,
241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (dairy cooperative conspired to fix retail price
of milk in violation of Sherman Act), aft'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). See also
Hufstedler, supra note 29, at 462 (collecting cases in which predatory trade prac-
tices were found).
198. 362 U.S. 458 (1960) (Capper-Volstead does not insulate anti-competi-
tive cooperative conduct from antitrust sanctions and, therefore, cooperatives
are to be treated equally with corporations under the antitrust laws, thereby in-
curring liability for anticompetitive practices). For a further discussion of the
principles of Maryland & Virginia Milk, see supra notes 174-179 and accompany-
ing text.
A particularly prescient law student, analyzing the effect of Maryland & Vir-
ginia Milk on future jurisprudence, wrote:
Some may contend that the opinion holds only those trade practices
and methods of competition that can be styled 'predatory' as outside
the 'legitimate objects' of a Capper-Volstead cooperative. This would
be to suggest that the court has promulgated special standards for an
exempt class under the antitrust laws ... In light of the entire opinion
such a position seems misleading, and a last ditch attempt to give new
life to the concept of a class privilege for agricultural cooperatives....
In addition, cooperatives are amenable to standards gauging the con-
duct of business corporations.
Note, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws: A New Departure, 36 IND. L.J.
497, 502 n.27 (1961).
199. For a discussion of cases in which courts have required proof of preda-
tion as a prerequisite to a finding of monopolization by a cooperative, see infra
note 200-205 and accompanying text.
In discussing thejudiciary's approach to a charge of alleged monopolization
by a cooperative, one commentator has noted that "[tihe contest then is to de-
termine whether or not the activity is a 'legitimate object' of an association or
whether it constitutes a 'predatory trade practice.' " Hufstedler, supra note 29,
at 459. The effect of this standard is to create a much narrower class of inter-
dicted activities without regard to the economic effects of such activities. Preda-
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Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc. ,200 rejected the application of Grinnell to
cooperatives on the ground that "the formation, growth, and op-
eration of a powerful cooperative is obviously a 'willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of such power' and will rarely result from 'a
superior product, business acumen or historic accident.' "201 It
held that a Sherman section 2 claim may only be sustained upon
proof of the acquisition of monopoly power by "other, predatory
means. '"202 The Eleventh Circuit, relying heavily on Fairdale
Farms, affirmed a district court holding that monopolization was
not possible without predation in a case 20 3 involving the same de-
fendant and many of the same practices as the Sixth Circuit case
of United States v. Dairymen, Inc.204 One district court has even
limited proof of predation to acts that have been found to be
predatory in the past.205
tion is generally associated with business behaviors that would "not otherwise
enhance profits but which are utilized to enlarge the predator's market share
with the expectation that this will lead to a long run gain in profits." Brodley &
Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Stan-
dards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 741 (1981).
200. 635 F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
In Fairdale Farms, a milk producer brought an antitrust suit against two agricul-
tural cooperatives alleging that they had illegally fixed raw milk prices. 635 F.2d
at 1038.
201. 635 F.2d at 1045 (citations omitted).
202. Id. This departure has been lauded by at least two commentators. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 119, at 492-94 (congressional intent was to allow ex-
emption in absence of predation); Note, Antitrust Law-Fairdale Farms, Inc. v.
Yankee Milk Inc.-The Right of Agricultural Cooperatives to Possess Monopoly Power, 7
J. CORP. L. 339, 351 (1982) (prosecution allowable only when predation or un-
due price enhancement is present).
203. Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 715 F.2d 520 (11 th Cir. 1983),
aff'g 512 F. Supp. 608, 642 (M.D. Ga. 1981), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
204. 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981). The Kinnett Dairies decision suffers from
other infirmities. The court also concluded that, even if the Capper-Volstead
Act provided no immunity, Dairymen, Inc., could not be found to have monopo-
lized, "lacking monopoly power in the relevant geographic market." Kinnett
Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 643 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715
F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). However, the
court's definition of the relevant market is inappropriately wide in scope, since it
refused to consider "submarkets", thus diluting the court's estimation of the
strength of Dairymen, Inc.'s market power. 512 F. Supp. at 643. For a discus-
sion of the appropriateness of submarkets in Sherman Act cases, see supra note
112 and accompanying text.
205. GVF Cannery, Inc. v. California Tomato Growers Ass'n, 511 F. Supp.
711, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The district court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky in Kinnett Dairies went almost as far when it cited Fairdale Farms as shedding
light on the meaning of predatory as "[t]he use of such tactics as picketing and
harassment ... boycotts .. .coerced membership ... and discriminatory pric-
ing." Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 642 (M.D. Ga.
1981) (citing Fairdale Farms 635 F.2d 1037), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11 th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). The court went on to conclude: "In the pres-
ent case, we have heard nothing of coerced membership, nor of picketing and
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The wholesale rejection of the Grinnell standard by the Fair-
dale Farms court and its followers fails to take into account that
this rule can easily be applied to agricultural cooperatives.20 6 Co-
operative growth due to voluntary membership or agreements,
higher quality product, better service to members or customers,
more efficient operation, and the like, is permissible, even if it
results in monopoly power. But the acquisition or maintenance
of that power via anticompetitive behavior or competition stifling
activity (whether or not it is deemed "predatory") is not among
the "legitimate objects" of cooperation. 20 7 The appropriate co-
operative monopolization standard is one that strikes a balance
between accommodating cooperative countervailing power on
the one hand, and preventing the agglomeration of supervailing
power by anticompetitive means on the other. The Grinnell stan-
dard strikes this balance. 208
Due to weak enforcement of antitrust rules, cooperatives
have been able to achieve supervailing power. In the dairy indus-
harassment, nor of boycotts, nor of discriminatory pricing .... The evidence of
'such tactics' is conspicuously absent." 512 F. Supp. at 642. The Kinnett Dairies
case was based in part upon different prices depending upon a handler's use of
non-member milk (stip. S254) and upon classified pricing-price discrimina-
tion-in raw milk prices. Trial Tr. at 235-55, 517-26.
206. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). For a discussion of the refor-
mulation of the Grinnell standard by the Second Circuit in Berkey Photo, see supra
note 194 and accompanying text.
207. Maryland & Virginia Milk, 362 U.S. at 466 (no congressional intent to
vest cooperatives with unrestricted power to restrain trade or to achieve monop-
oly by preying on competitors).
208. Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F.
Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1954) is widely cited in support of a broad antitrust exemp-
tion for cooperatives. Yet, examination of the jury instructions reveals that the
means by which market power was gained was the operative factor-essentially,
the Grinnell standard.
There is nothing unlawful under the Sherman Act or any other antitrust
act in trying to get even 100 percent of the market through skill, effi-
ciency, superiority of product, or like entirely laudable steps. It is not
unlawful . . .for a Capper-Volstead cooperative . . .to try to acquire
even 100 percent of the market if it does it exclusively through market-
ing agreements approved under the Capper-Vosltead Act .... [I]t is
not a violation of the Sherman Act or any other anti-trust act for a Cap-
per-Volstead cooperative to acquire a large, even a 100 percent, posi-
tion in a market if it does it solely through those steps which involve
cooperative purchasing and cooperative selling.
On the other hand, it would be a violation of the law and it would
be a prohibited monopolization for a .. .group of persons to seek to
secure a dominant share of the market through a restraint of trade
which was prohibited, or through a predatory practice, or through the bad
faith use of otherwise legitimate devices.
Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
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try this has been accomplished by anticompetitive means as well
as by voluntary membership and natural growth. Many coopera-
tive practices, while not predatory in the sense of being devoid of
business justification, are undertaken with the intent and effect of
reducing, hindering, or eliminating competition. 20 9 Supervailing
power has also been achieved through a combination of devices,
which standing alone may appear to be innocuous, but in combi-
nation are anticompetitive. Monopoly power achieved by use of
these non-predatory yet anticompetitive means is every bit as ne-
farious as monopoly power achieved by predation.
B. Mergers
Cooperative mergers have proved to be an effective and pop-
ular way to concentrate and increase cooperative market power.
In the dairy industry, the largest cooperatives have attained their
monopoly positions in part through the acquisition of competing
cooperatives. 210 Cooperative-cooperative mergers should be
subject to the same scrutiny under section 7 of the Clayton Act2 1'
as corporate mergers and mergers of cooperatives with non-coop-
209. Examples of anticompetitive dairy cooperative activities that may not
be labeled by courts as predatory include: exclusive dealing or full supply con-
tracts which lock out competitors; mergers of cooperatives which have, as an
important aspect, the elimination of competition; pooling practices which fore-
close competition; manipulation of regulations with the aim of keeping compet-
ing product or sellers out of the market; exclusive hauling requirements;
agreements with other cooperatives to allocate territory or customers; discrimi-
natory pricing or service charges; the use of litigation or threats of litigation to
deter customers from buying from competitors; refusals to honor membership
termination notices or to reveal termination dates; maintenance of reserve sup-
plies far in excess of needs of members; supply cut-offs or threatened cut-offs to
induce customers to accede to unilateral demands; supply contracts of long du-
ration; surcharge where customers bought from a competing supplier; etc. See,
e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1190-93 (8th Cir.
1982); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 624 (M.D. Ga.
1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
210. Between 1968 and 1972, 217 local cooperatives merged to form four
large regional cooperatives: AMPI; Dairymen, Inc.; Mid-America Dairymen,
Inc.; and Milk, Inc. R. FoNEs, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 173.
211. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be susbstantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
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eratives. Antitrust exemptions are not to be lightly implied, but
must be based on clear expressions of congressional intent, and
should be narrowly and strictly construed 212 Yet, cooperative-
cooperative mergers have never been challenged and there ap-
pears to be a perception that they are exempt. Unable to point to
statutory language or legislative history to support immunity, the
proponents of a merger exemption try to draw an analogy be-
tween mergers and the activities enumerated in the Capper-Vol-
stead Act. However, upon close inspection, this analogy
disintegrates. Since a clear expression to make cooperative merg-
ers immune is conspicuously absent from both section 6 of the
Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act, there is no basis for
failing to subject cooperative mergers to Clayton section 7
scrutiny. 213
The Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to imply an anti-
trust exemption unless it is absolutely necessary to effectuate the
statutory scheme. 214 Thus, the Supreme Court had no difficulty
holding that the merger between a dairy cooperative and a com-
peting proprietary processor was proscribed by section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The Court's opinion in Maryland & Virginia Milk in-
cluded a lengthy analysis that clearly stated that cooperative
transactions are subject to the same rules as those of corpora-
tions.21 5 Nor is there any reason to expect that the Court would
imply an exemption for the merger of two cooperatives. In Sun-
kist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co. 216 the Court
was careful to point out that the cooperatives accused of conspir-
ing were one entity: "[I]n practical effect and in the contempla-
tion of the statutes [Clayton section 6 and Capper-Volstead] it
was one 'organization' or 'association' "217 and thus incapable of
conspiring with itself.21 8 At the same time, the Court emphasized
212. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973) (im-
plied exemptions disfavored); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 350-51 (1963) (implied immunity based on regulatory statute strongly dis-
favored); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939) (refusing to
find implied immunity where not expressly granted).
213. Cf United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939) (there
must be clear repugnance between old and new laws to support implied repeal
of statutory provision).
214. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 682-83
(1975) (proper approach wherever possible is to reconcile antitrust laws and
regulatory scheme); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-60
(1963) (repeal is implied only if necessary to make statute work).
215. 362 U.S. at 468-70.
216. 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
217. Id. at 29.
218. Id. at 30.
240 [Vol. 31: p. 183
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that its decision "in no way detracts from earlier cases" holding
cooperatives to the same responsibilities as corporations and nar-
rowly construing the scope of the antitrust exemption. 21 9 Subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have continued to confirm the
cooperative exemption to the narrowest possible borders. 220
Yet, considerable uncertainty surrounds the status of cooper-
ative mergers. 221 Neither the Justice Department nor the Federal
Trade Commission has ever challenged an inter-cooperative
merger, despite staff reports arguing in favor of closer scrutiny. 222
The perception persists that inter-cooperative mergers are im-
mune from antitrust law. 2 23 The immunity argument seems to
rest on two grounds: (1) under Capper-Volstead's authorization
of "marketing agencies in common," two independent coopera-
tives could engage in so much joint action as to be equivalent to a
merger; (2) since two competing cooperatives could permissibly
dissolve and the members recombine into one larger cooperative,
the distinction between that form of voluntary membership
growth and merger is de minimis. Essentially, a supposed de
facto functional equivalence supplies the rationale for an implied
immunity. However, under closer scrutiny, these arguments fail,
as they conceal significant differences between merger on the one
219. Id. The court was referring to the principles laid out in United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (no antitrust exemption for activities with non-
cooperatives) and Maryland & Virginia Milk, 362 U.S. 465 (cooperatives have
same rights and responsibilities as corporations).
220. See National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816,
828-29 (1978) (depriving cooperative of all immunity if even one member is
non-farmer).
221. While concluding that the law as presently written subjects coopera-
tive mergers to Clayton § 7 scrutiny, the National Commission for the review of
Antitrust Laws and Procedures recommended that the law be amended to re-
move uncertainty. Some commissioners also suggested that in the meantime,
the Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission bring a test case. REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 302, 314 n.32 (1978) [herein-
after cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION'S REPORT].
222. See R. FONES,J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 211-17; F. LIP-
SON & C. BATTERTON, supra note 67, at 52-59 (discussing history of application of
antitrust laws to cooperative activity and concluding that Clayton § 7 should ap-
ply to intercooperative mergers).
223. Both the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Reports
acknowledge this perception, without attribution. Id. See also Note, supra note 9,
at 348; Note, supra note 193, at 413. Warlich and Brill find no legal basis on
which to infer such an exemption but opine that a merger exemption is an "ap-
parent probable." Warlich & Brill, supra note 128, at 583. In addition,
Manchester states that inter-cooperative mergers "should be regarded as en-
tirely within the scope of the ... exemption." A.C. MANCHESTER, supra note 62,
at 33.
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hand and joint marketing or dissolution/recombination on the
other.
Merger, in which one or both competing firms cease to exist
and a new, single entity emerges, is the most durable and perma-
nent method of combination and concentration. 22 4 It involves
the comingling of assets, liabilities, members, and identities, and
is exceedingly difficult to unravel once it is consummated. Joint
marketing agreements, on the other hand, are limited in scope
and duration. Those areas not covered by the agreements remain
open to competition between the cooperatives. The agreements
may be terminated, or not renewed, enabling the cooperatives to
withdraw their assets and members from the agreement and to
resume complete competition with relative ease. No matter how
far-reaching the agreements, the individual cooperatives retain
their identities, not only with regard to their customers, but vis-A-
vis their members as well. Moreover, even joint marketing agree-
ments are subject to the proviso that they not be used to monopo-
lize 225 or unduly enhance prices. 226 The substantial legal and
economic differences between mergers and joint marketing
agreements preclude their being treated as functional
equivalents.
The argument that there is a de minimis distinction between
merger and dissolution/reformation is equally frail. Most of the
mergers between dairy cooperatives have been effectuated either
by majority vote of the membership or by the Board of Directors.
The membership contracts are then carried over into the new co-
operative, without giving individual members the opportunity to
"opt out." Membership agreements have been vigorously en-
forced by the merged cooperatives. Economic theory suggests
that if increasing market power were the goal of the merger, farm-
ers would be more likely to vote in favor of it if all members
would be bound to the merger. 22 7 Nor is opting out of the new
224. A merger not only increases the surviving firm's market share, but de-
creases the number of competitors. R. FONES, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra
note 12, at 205-06.
225. Maryland & Virginia Milk, 362 U.S. at 472; Treasure Valley Potato Bar-
gaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 999 (1974). It would be anomalous, indeed, to hold that agreements
between cooperatives must pass muster under Sherman § 2, but that coopera-
tives may merge with impunity, regardless of the competitive consequences.
226. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982).
227. Cooperatives trying to achieve supervailing power find that their
greatest threat is the free rider problem. Absent an expectation of predatory or
exclusionary tactics on the part of the cooperative, a producer's most favorable
position would be to vote to require all other producers to form a single coopera-
242 [Vol. 31: p. 183
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cooperative on the expiration of the membership contract a real-
istic alternative. In addition to taking over the supply contracts of
the predecessor cooperatives, the new cooperative may have al-
ready established full supply contracts in the market. To make
matters more difficult, some cooperatives have deliberately stag-
gered membership renewal dates so that farmers on economically
efficient milk routes would not be free at the same time.22 8 In this
respect, mergers frustrate, rather than further, the goal of volun-
tary farmer association.
Dissolution and recombination is neither as risk-free nor as
simple as it appears on its face. Once a cooperative decides to
dissolve, the individual members must make a voluntary decision
to "opt in" to the new organization. Because their membership is
not automatic, members are also free to form new cooperatives,
join competing cooperatives, or remain independent. In addi-
tion, there is no guarantee of sales for the new entity. Supply
contracts with customers must be either cancelled or sold. In dis-
posing of these and other assets, the dissolving cooperative must
fulfill its fiduciary duty to return full value to the membership.
The greater risk and difficulty of dissolution/reformation make it
a considerably less attractive and less reliable means of amalga-
mating cooperative power than merger.229 The same risk and
tive with the intention of being able to free ride the Class I monopoly prices.
The membership policies described above tend to ameliorate the free rider
problem and minimize the risk to the new entity. Cooperative mergers aimed at
achieving countervailing power or increasing efficiencies do not incur the same
risks-the interests of all producers are maximized by joining the new entity. As
long as the new cooperative does not face higher costs than individual farmers
and does not institute supervailing prices, all products will be sold at the com-
petitive price, whether by a member or by a non-member; one cannot free ride
efficiencies. An efficiency- or countervailing power-oriented merger might be
the equivalent of dissolution and reformation and may not run afoul of Clayton
§ 7.
228. R. FoNE s, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at 215-17. There is
evidence that some cooperative mergers may have been coerced; that they may
have been partly the result of misleading information; or that they may have
flowed, in part, from special deals given to members of the farmer cooperatives'
boards of directors. P.M. Eisenstat, R.T. Masson & D. Roddy, supra note 4, at
173-81. Dairymen, Inc., bound its new merged members to a two-year initial
term (based on an ambiguously worded membership contract) and filed suit to
enforce these terms. Trial Tr. at 4106, 4113-4115, 4121 United States v. Dairy-
men, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62.053 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (Shelor testi-
mony) (discussing the contractual relationships of coop members), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981).
229. Cooperatives appreciate this difference. Studies show that mergers far
outnumber dissolutions. R. FoNEs, J. HALL & R.T. MASSON, supra note 12, at
217. The risks increase as the object of the merger moves from countervailing
to supervailing power.
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complication also demonstrate that the difference between the
two is more than de minimis. 230 Moreover, mergers prevent frag-
mentation from performing its expected role as a natural check
on the growth of cooperative power. 23'
Thus, there is no basis, in law or fact, to exempt cooperative
mergers from Clayton section 7 scrutiny. The Secretary of Agri-
culture has acknowledged that section 7 liability should not place
an undue burden on cooperatives. 23 2 This is not to say that all
cooperative mergers should be forbidden. Only those which may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
should be subject to sanctions. In reviewing a proposed merger,
the economic factors of the commodity, the markets, and the co-
operatives involved, including membership provisions, should be
considered. This is analogous to the treatment given corporate
mergers.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 233 is a prophylactic statute,
aimed at stopping one method of monopolization in its incipi-
ency. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 284 is used to repair the dam-
age after monopolization has occurred or has been attempted. A
merger or series of mergers that is consummated without chal-
lenge under Clayton section 7 may, nevertheless, form the basis
for Sherman section 2 liability. At least one circuit has held that
cooperatives may not use mergers as a means of monopolization
or as a part of an anticompetitive scheme when done by coercion,
fraud, or other unlawful means. 23 5 This argument is especially
230. It has been suggested by some commentators that a merger in which
members were truly free to opt out of the new enterprise and be reimbursed the
value of the membership shares is identical, for all practical purposes, to an in-
crease in cooperative size through voluntary accession of new members. Hul-
bert, Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FARMER
COOPERATIVE SERV., INFORMATION No. 70 at 24 (1970); Mahaffie, Cooperative Ex-
emptions Under the Antitrust Laws: A Prosecutor's View, 22 AD. L. REV. 435, 441
(1970) (if two exempt cooperatives merge, new cooperative will be exempt);
Note, supra note 9, at 374-75. However, this type of merger presumably allows
the new cooperative to take over the supply contracts of its predecessors. This
could render the ability of individual members to opt out and compete virtually
meaningless, if most sources of customers were foreclosed. While this option
appears to address the voluntary membership problem, the voluntariness may
be more symbolic than real and the competitive implicaitons are the same as
with any other merger.
231. For a discussion of "natural" limits on cooperative power, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
232. See NATIONAL COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 221, at 302 (testimony
of Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
235. Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1206-08 (8th Cir.
244 [Vol. 31: p. 183
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compelling when the goal of the merger is not to gain greater
efficiency or countervailing power, but to gain supervailing
power. Mergers are simply not among the means delineated in
the Capper-Volstead Act by which cooperatives may achieve their
"legitimate objects."
Therefore, cooperative mergers should be subject to the
same antitrust scrutiny as corporate mergers. Given the Supreme
Court's refusal to imply antitrust exemptions where they are not
expressly granted, there is no basis for asserting immunity for co-
operative mergers. Analogies between cooperative mergers and
permitted cooperative activities fade under close examination.
Equally important, the anticompetitive potential of cooperative
mergers is no less, and in light of permitted concerted activity,
perhaps greater, than that of corporate mergers. The Justice De-
partment and Federal Trade Commission should take immediate
steps toward enforcing section 7 of the Clayton Act against
cooperatives.
C. Undue Price Enhancement
Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act permits farmers and
cooperatives to engage in price-fixing. 236 The Act does this by
permitting farmers to set prices jointly through a cooperative, by
authorizing "marketing agencies in common" and "necessary
contracts and agreements to effect such purposes" 237 -behavior
that would otherwise be improper and constitute a per se illegal
restraint of trade. 238 Section 2239 subjects cooperative price fix-
ing to review by the Secretary of Agriculture under a rule of rea-
son: these activities are permitted as long as they do not cause
1982) (overriding issue is one of tactics and intent). See also Maryland & Virginia
Milk, 362 U.S. at 472.
236. Fairdale Farms, 635 F.2d at 1039 (establishment of price is an integral
part of marketing); Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 217 (9th Cir.) (not unlawful for cooperatives to agree to set
fair price), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 499 (1974).
237. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
238. Price fixing agreements are an illegal restraint of trade under the Sher-
man Act, regardless of the alleged reasonableness of the prices as fixed. See
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899) (agree-
ment of pipe manufacturers which had purpose and effect of limiting prices was
illegal restraint of trade under Sherman Act); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n,
171 U.S. 505, 559-62 (1898) (voluntary association of railroad companies which
created uniform rates was illegal restraint of trade); United States v. Trans-Mis-
souri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340-42 (1897) (association of railroad compa-
nies which fixed uniform rates was unlawful restraint of trade even if rates were
reasonable).
239. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982).
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prices to become unduly enhanced. 240 The Secretary of Agricul-
ture is charged with responsibility for taking corrective action
whenever a cooperative causes unduly enhanced prices through
monopolization or restraint of trade. This section was hailed by
its sponsors as an integral part of the scheme and was designed to
protect consumers from any ill effects of farmer cooperation. 24'
The Supreme Court has held that section 2 is a supplement to the
courts' enforcement powers under the antitrust laws. 242 Despite
evidence that supervailing cooperative power has unduly en-
hanced prices, 243 no Secretary of Agriculture has ever taken ac-
tion pursuant to this section. 244
The Secretary's inaction can be attributed, in part, to a mis-
apprehension of the grounds upon which action can be taken as
well as a misunderstanding of the remedies available once a viola-
tion has been found.245 A further obstacle is presented by the
Secretary's failure to formulate a precise, economically determi-
nable definition of undue price enhancement. 246 The Secretary's
position is that before action can be taken under section 2, in ad-
240. For a discussion of the Secretary of Agriculture's authority, see supra
notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion of the statutory scheme, see supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text.
242. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 205-06 (1939) (§ 2 of Cap-
per-Volstead is not substitute for judicial remedies under Sherman Act, but is
added check upon cooperatives that may be exercised by Secretary of Agricul-
ture); Maryland & Virginia Milk, 362 U.S. at 462-63 (allowance of Secretary of
Agriculture to issue cease and desist order does not give Secretary exclusive
jurisdiciton, but merely creates another remedy in addition to provisions of
Sherman Act).
243. For a discussion of the measurement and use of cooperative market
power, see supra notes 128-71 and accompanying text.
244. See Folsom, supra note 62, at 1635-37. In response to a petition filed
with the USDA charging undue price enhancement in the dairy industry, a Cap-
per-Volstead committee was convened to investigate, but held no hearings. The
Committee identified twelve markets involving six cooperatives in which there
was "evidence of prices which are possibly out of line with market forces." 1976
REPORT, supra note 63, at 53. The Committee recommended that, despite the
fact that the activities of dairy cooperatives "may have resulted in undue price
enhancement .... action by the Secretary would be superfluous" because the
Justice Department had just signed consent decrees with two of the six coopera-
tives and had an action pending against a third. Id. No further action was taken
by USDA.
245. Other commentators ascribe the lack of enforcement activity to an in-
herent conflict of interest between the Secretary's responsibilities under Capper-
Volstead and USDA's role as the champion of agriculture and promoter of coop-
erative growth. See, e.g., Folsom, supra note 62, at 1631; Note, supra note 9, at
368.
246. For a discussion of USDA's four different definitions of undue price
enhancement, see supra note 63.
246
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dition to unduly enhanced prices, there must be separate evi-
dence of monopolization or restraint of trade by one or more
cooperatives,2 47 i.e., activity that is already beyond the purview of
the section 1 exemption. The Secretary starts with the premise
that "very few, if any, cooperatives [have] the power to restrict
entry of new producers, . . . or to restrict access to markets." 248
He therefore concludes that "undue price enhancement would
have to rest on the other practices, most of which would be illegal
whether or not they resulted in undue price enhancement." 249
The proposed USDA monitoring process would shield entire
markets from monitoring unless they exhibited such "other
practices. "250
Such a construction of the reach of section 2 makes it com-
pletely redundant, rather than supplementary, and is contrary to
its intended scope and purpose. Congress was concerned that
prices might be unduly enhanced as a result of farmers getting
together and discussing and agreeing on prices, allocating territo-
ries and customers, or uniting in a single entity to market their
products. 25 1 These are all activities which, but for section 1, would
be considered acts of monopolization or restraints of trade.25 2 It
247. 1979 REPORT, supra note 63, at ii. The proposals from this committee
envision a two-step process: (1) deciding "whether evidence of undue price en-
hancement exists"; (2) identifying "monopolization or restraint of trade ...
where evidence of possible undue price enhancement has been found." Id. at iii.
See also E.V. JESSE, A.C. JOHNSON & B.W. MARION, supra note 63, at 9-11; A.C.
MANCHESTER, supra note 62, at iv, 38.
248. 1979 REPORT, supra note 63, at 10. The Secretary fails to mention that
the inability to restrict total supply is irrelevant to the ability to enhance prices
where a classified pricing scheme is in effect. For a discussion of classified pric-
ing and supervailing power, see supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
249. 1979 REPORT, supra note 63, at 10.
250. Id. at 15. The types of conduct that would make a cooperative a candi-
date for further monitoring include: restrictions on output; restrictions on entry
of new members; coercively obtained full-supply contracts; other practices which
foreclose markets to others; anticompetitive agreements between cooperatives
and noncooperatives; restrictions on exit of members (the focus would be on the
length of the membership contracts, with no mention of staggered expiration
dates). This is nothing more than a compilation of cooperative practices that the
courts have found to be predatory and violative of the Sherman Act. Id. See
Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1193 (8th Cir. 1982); Huf-
stedler, supra note 29, at 459.
251. For a discussion of the congressional intent behind § 2, see supra notes
33, 35 & 38.
252. For a discussion of the activities and organizations specifically cited by
Congress as the types that would be illegal if § 1 had not been enacted, see supra
notes 17, 18, 24 & 29 and accompanying text and note 36. The Supreme Court
noted, "[Section 2] of the Capper-Volstead Act is auxiliary and was intended...
as a qualification of the authorization given to cooperative agricultural produ-
cers by [§ 1], so that if the collective action of such producers, as there permit-
19861 247
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was from this danger that legislators sought to protect the public
when they gave the Secretary enforcement powers as a supple-
ment to existing antitrust laws. 253 Thus, in order to fulfill his reg-
ulatory responsibility under the Capper-Volstead Act, the
Secretary must take action whenever "the prices charged by any
of these associations are excessive." 254 The causes of such unduly
enhanced prices, sufficient to trigger action under section 2, may
be a price fixing agreement between cooperatives; mergers or
federations of cooperatives; marketing agreements, including
joint marketing and market allocation; clauses in contracts with
members or customers; even the very existence of a price setting
cooperative facing little or no competition. In short, any con-
certed activity by farmers to affect prices restrains trade. If it un-
duly enhances price it should be subject to action under section 2,
regardless of whether the activity rises to the level of predation or
involves nonfarmers.2 55
A further impediment to effective enforcement under section
2 of the Capper-Volstead Act is the Secretary's unduly restrictive
view of the remedies available. This rests on: (1) the previously
described misconception of the definition of restraint of trade or
monopolization to which a cease-and-desist order may apply; 256
and (2) the belief that a cease-and-desist order may not be used
for structural relief against a single cooperative.2 57 The very text
of the statute contradicts the USDA view. If a cooperative
"monopolizes or restrains trade ... to such an extent that [prices
are] unduly enhanced" thereby the Secretary is required to issue
an order directing such association to cease and desist from mo-
nopolization or restraint of trade.2 58 The statute requires that the
offending cooperative be ordered to stop doing whatever caused
ted, results in . . . monopolization or unduly enhanced prices, [the Secretary]
may intervene and ... control the action thus taken under [§ 1]." United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 206 (1939).
253. For a discussion of Congress' intent to allow the Secretary of Agricul-
ture enforcement power as another safeguard against anticompetitive activity,
see supra notes 33-34. For a discussion of cases adopting this view of the Secre-
tary's enforcement power, see supra note 242.
254. H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921). The Secretary
"shall" act if he has "reason to believe" that there is undue price enhancement.
7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982).
255. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 206 (1939) (Secretary may
take action if he determines there is monopoly or undue price enhancement).
256. 1979 REPORT, supra note 63, at 53. For a discussion of the Secretary's
standards for issuing cease-and-desist orders, see supra note 247 and accompa-
nying text.
257. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 25.
258. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982).
248 [Vol. 3 1: p. 183
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the undue price enhancement.2 59 The remedy must be tailored to
address the cause of the problem. This extends to "structural"
relief as well. A merger may be dissolved, membership contracts
may be canceled or modified, or a 100% market share may be
relinquished if necessary to counteract unduly enhanced prices.
"Section 2 .. .has for its purpose the alleviation of the evils of
monopoly, or those that may follow from authorized combina-
tions, by the granting of something like supervisory control to the
Secretary of Agriculture." 260
The third obstacle to the realization of the intended benefits
of section 2 is the needlessly elusive definition of undue price en-
hancement. Within the same paragraph, the Secretary poses two
separate tests:
[T]he standard for judging undue price enhancement
turns on whether a farmer cooperative has managed to
go beyond the level of equality in market power in nego-
tiating price and trade terms. Prices to farmer coopera-
tives that significantly exceed the level associated with
equality of market power would constitute undue price
enhancement.261
No justification is given for the leap from "beyond equality" to
"significantly beyond equality," nor can one be found. The com-
petitive price that results from equality of bargaining power, or
from countervailing power, 262 is the goal of the Clayton section
6/Capper-Volstead scheme. A price that results from supervail-
ing power is an unduly enhanced price, 263 whether or not it is
"significantly" above the competitive level.
Unduly enhanced prices have existed in the dairy industry for
some time. Cooperatives with high market shares generally pos-
sess supervailing power which manifests itself in over-Order pre-
miums on Class I milk in excess of those on Class II milk.264 To
the extent that they do not reflect the value of services provided
259. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 206 (1939) (Secretary may
control action taken under exemption granted by § 1 of Capper-Volstead Act).
260. S. REP. No. 236, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921).
261. 1979 REPORT, supra note 63, at 8 (emphasis added) (discussion of how
far prices must move before violation is found).
262. For a discussion of the effect of countervailing power and how it will
result in a competitive price, see Graph 4 and accompanying discussion, supra
note 54.
263. For an economic analysis of how supervailing power can result in un-
duly enhanced prices of products, see Graph 5 and accompanying discussion,
supra note 64.
264. For a discussion of how cooperatives with high market shares can usu-
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to buyers, those premiums represent the amount by which prices
have been unduly enhanced. In many cases, this amount is quite
high.2 65
The Secretary's powers under section 2 are not exclusive.2 66
Nor does his failure to act mean that the causes of unduly en-
hanced prices are immune from attack. If the statutory scheme
providing the limited antitrust exemption for agriculture is
viewed as a whole, a new argument emerges. Farmers were to be
protected from the reach of the antitrust laws when they acted
together to achieve their "legitimate objects." 267 Beyond enhanc-
ing marketing efficiency, the only legitimate object of cooperation
is countervailing power. 268 Activities in pursuit of countervailing
power, enumerated in Capper-Volstead section 1, are immune
from the antitrust laws, as are any other specifically exempted ac-
tivities. As long as farmers, through their cooperatives, achieve
their legitimate objects, they enjoy the benefits of an antitrust ex-
emption. But, once they engage in activities that are not in pur-
suit of those legitimate objects, the exemption is lost.2 69 Section
2 of the Capper-Volstead Act makes it clear that undue price en-
hancement is not a legitimate object of cooperation. Hence, if
cooperation results in unduly enhanced prices, the antitrust ex-
emption ceases to operate. It follows that the Justice Department,
Federal Trade Commission, and private litigants may institute ac-
tions against concerted farmer activity that achieves an illegiti-
mate object such as supervailing power or unduly enhanced
prices. This would reach behavior that, but for the exemption, would
violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts, such as price fixing agree-
ments, pooling arrangements, restrictive membership agree-
ments, improper use of high market share-anything, in short,
ally achieve excess premiums, see supra notes 131-41 & 147-55 and accompany-
ing text.
265. According to USDA's own data, from 1974 through mid-1976, over-
Order premiums exceeded fifty cents per hundredweight for at least one year in
fourteen different markets. 1976 REPORT, supra note 63, at 43.
266. See supra note 242.
267. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
268. Maryland & Virginia Milk, 362 U.S. at 466-67 (purpose of law indicates
that farmers should be allowed to organize to compete on equal footing with
corporations to whom they sell their produce).
269. Id. at 467 (if associations allowed by Capper-Volstead Act engage in
any activity forbidden by Sherman Act, association will be subject to penalties
under Sherman Act). Cf National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436
U.S. 816, 828-29 (1978) (complete loss of immunity when one member of coop-
erative is not producer).
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that restrains trade if the result is prices that are unduly
enhanced.
Thus, properly used, the second section of the Capper-Vol-
stead Act provides a powerful and expeditious tool for maintain-
ing the delicate balance of power Congress sought to achieve. At
great cost to the consuming public, the Secretary of Agriculture
has shirked his responsibility to supervise cooperative pricing.
However, a creative approach that analyzes the statutory scheme
in its totality can ameliorate undue price enhancement, the princi-
pal evil of supervailing power, and can also combat high con-
sumer prices.
CONCLUSION
Agricultural cooperatives have played an important role in
increasing economic efficiency and bettering farmers' market po-
sition. However, in some markets, cooperatives have come to
wield substantial monopoly power. The causes of this include
regulatory neglect and judicial misapplication of economic theory
and legal analysis. Supervailing cooperative power results in un-
duly enhanced prices. This cost is ultimately borne by the
consumer.
The time has come for a fresh look at the agricultural exemp-
tion, its goals and its limits. This re-examination must start with
sound economic analysis that takes into account the realities of
markets and the practical indicia of market power. A legal analy-
sis can then be built upon that economic foundation to fulfill the
intention of the exemption's framers-to foster countervailing
power while preventing the attainment of supervailing power.
Viewed as a whole, the Capper-Volstead and Clayton Acts state
that as long as cooperatives pursue their "legitimate objects,"
they enjoy limited immunity from the antitrust laws. But there is
no haven for practices that serve illegitimate objects. Undue
price enhancement, stifling of competition, merging, or otherwise
collaborating to attain supervailing power need not be tolerated.
Failure to administer the exemption so that cooperatives are
held to the same responsibilities under the antitrust laws as are
corporations can only encourage the spread of supervailing
power to new agricultural markets. In addition, the Department
of Agriculture must accept its responsibility to ensure that con-
certed farmer activity does not unduly enhance prices. The De-
partment must develop an economically and legally sound plan
for enforcement. If courts and administrators fail to prune the
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dimensions of the exemption to its originally intended propor-
tions, congressional intervention will be necessary to prevent
consumers from paying the price of supervailing cooperative
power.
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